Sixth Circuit: James McKinney v. Bonita Hoffner

Habeas, AEDPA, Miranda


State Supreme Court's holdings -- that a facially equivocal statement was not interrogation and that deft's invocation of right to counsel followed shortly thereafter by an expressed willingness to talk was not a Miranda violation -- might have been made by a fair-minded jurist.

Dissent doesn't account for AEDPA default.

Dissent -- analysis of second utterance should be considered solely as waiver of expressed invocation.


James McKinney v. Bonita Hoffner

Ninth Circuit: ERIC MANN V. CHARLES RYAN

En Banc, Habeas, AEDPA, Ineffective Assistance



Denial of Habeas for Ineffective Assistance, as state court's findings on defense lawyer's choices might have been made by fair-minded jurists.

State intermediate appeal on the collateral challenge did not inappropriately consider whether it was more likely than not that the  verdict/sentence had been affected rather than asking if the error resulted in a reasonable probability of a difference in the outcome.  Court's statement that nothing would have changed can be read to imply the reasonable probability standard.

Claim that state applied unconstitutional nexus test for mitigation factors, although not raised here, does not establish that rulings on the initial collateral challenge considered the wrong set of relevant mitigating factors.

Lack of explicit statement that new mitigation was considered on state direct and collateral challenge doesn't mean that it wasn't considered.

State Habeas findings not unreasonable.

Concurrence/Dissent --  Causal nexus error infected ruling on initial collateral challenge.  Intermediate appeal used preponderance standard.  Error on de novo review of ineffective assistance in mitigation.

Concurrence/Dissent 2 -- De novo review, but no prejudice.


ERIC MANN V. CHARLES RYAN

Second Circuit: Fuentes v. Griffin

Brady, Habeas, AEDPA


Habeas granted, as psychiatric records of critical witness offered substantial impeachment value.

Dissent: Materiality is intrinsically subjective.


Fuentes v. Griffin

Sixth Circuit: Cedric Carter v. Betty Mitchell

Habeas, AEDPA, Ineffective Assistance


Where specific claims are remanded, the District court should consider those claims in full, not the appeals court's characterization of them.

No abuse of discretion to deny a stay to exhaust state Habeas claims in a mixed petition where the evidence was available to deft on initial direct and collateral review

Although lack of initial objection to magistrate's finding on one collateral review claim is not jurisdictional for purposes of appellate review, this claim is insufficiently extraordinary to excuse the omission.

Trial counsel might have had strategic purpose for eliciting negative testimony on direct examination of mitigation expert and not calling the deft's mother.

 State collateral review did not inappropriately consider fundamental fairness when considering prejudice under Strickland, given lack of specific indication in the record.


Cedric Carter v. Betty Mitchell

Second Circuit: Blow v. United States

Habeas, AEDPA, Sentencing, Circuit Split


Permission granted for second/successive federal Habeas petition challenging sentence imposed under residual clause of Sentencing Guidelines, as the language is identical to the ACCA residual clause found unconstitutional.

Circuit split flagged.


Blow v. United States

Eleventh Circuit: In re: Gary Baptiste

Habeas, AEDPA


AEDPA's second-or-successive bar should be applied to applications under the state prisoner federal Habeas statute.

Denied here on merits and law of the case.


 In re: Gary Baptiste

Eleventh Circuit: Johnny L. Marshall v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

Habeas, Ineffective Assistance, Fourth Amendment, AEDPA


Habeas for ineffective assistance denied where counsel did not attempt to suppress identification made after suspect was transported back to the scene of the crime during a Terry stop.

Concurrence: State statute prohibits doing that during a Terrry stop, but AEDPA prohibits the writ, since the state statutory argument wasn't made in state Habeas.

Johnny L. Marshall v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

Eighth Circuit: Jerome Emmanuel Davis v. Warden Kent Grandlienard

Habeas, AEDPA, Miranda


As the post-invocation statement admitted at the trial was facially exculpatatory and cumulative, state court did not err in denying Habeas.

Concur in J -- The statement was the only evidence placing the deft at the scene of the crime, but state court could have reasonably read it as harmless error.


Jerome Emmanuel Davis  v.  Warden Kent Grandlienard

Sixth Circuit: Yaqob Thomas v. Joseph Meko

Habeas, AEDPA, FRCP


A second state Habeas claim ultimately deemed to be barred procedurally for having been available to the petitioner at the filing of the first petition nonetheless tolled the AEDPA clock, as the second petition also asserted a claim for relief from judgement under the state rules.

 Yaqob Thomas v. Joseph Meko

Seventh Circuit: Katrell Morris v. USA

Habeas, AEDPA, Attempt, ACCA

Habeas grant for challenge to ACCA residual clause predicate.  Although an unpublished decision of the Circuit has held the crime to be a valid predicate under another clause, it insufficiently considered the state's law of attempt.

Concur: Attempt as predicate should only require the attempt at an act that would itself satisfy all the elements.


Katrell Morris v.   USA

Sixth Circuit: In Re Michael Stansell

Habeas, AEDPA

A Habeas petition challenging a resentencing to add a period of post-release control is not second or successive for purposes od AEDPA.

Technical changes in the sentence, however, do not similarly reset the count.

In Re Michael Stansell

Third Circuit: Candice Staruh v. Superintendent Cambridge

FRE, Hearsay, Habeas, AEDPA

Refusal to allow hearsay evidence of admission of guilt by a family member of the deft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of constitutional law, as there were insufficient indicia of reliability and the speaker had an incentive to mislead the court.

Candice Staruh v. Superintendent Cambridge

First Circuit: Sullivan v. Marchilli

Souter, Habeas, Crim

State court did not unreasonably apply federal law on the issue, as the allegedly vague prohibition is found in the federal caselaw as well.

Due Process argument that the court would not have determined the image to fall within the statute if the proper First Amendment limits had been followed is irrelevant, since the state appellate review did not unreasonably apply the governing law.


Sullivan v. Marchilli

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Derrick Wheaten

AEDPA, Habeas

Untimely Certiorari petition filed with Supreme Court that is denied without sign that the lateness has been excused does not reset the statutory deadline for filing a subsequent Habeas petition.  Circuit footnote suggesting otherwise dicta.

Missed deadline by counsel in direct review did not constitute abandonment, as petitioner was timely notified of the late filing and sent a Habeas pamphlet.

Incorrect telephone guidance by Supreme Court clerk didn't cancel the fact that petitioner was on notice of the deadline.


USA v. Derrick Wheaten

Ninth Circuit: SELSO ORONA V. USA

Statute of Limitations, Habeas, AEDPA


The statutory one-year filing deadline for second or successive Habeas applications based on claims made retroactive to cases on collateral review is tolled by filing an application in the court of appeals to proceed with the writ, so long as the application states the claim at issue.


SELSO ORONA V. USA

Seventh Circuit: Rashaad Imani v. William Pollard

Sixth Amendment, Habeas, AEDPA

In colloquy with a deft who has requested to proceed without counsel, the duty of inquiry rests with the judge, and cannot be converted to an affirmative burden on the deft to prove capacity.

Where an articulate deft is without illness or impairment,deft is likely outside of the narrow range of cases precluded from self-representation.

Denial of request made weeks before trial on scheduling grounds is constitutional error.


Rashaad Imani v. William Pollard

Fifth Circuit: Michael Norris v. Lorie Davis, Director

AEDPA, Habeas

Circuit precedent at the time of conviction clearly established the need for a general mitigation instruction where there was evidence of good character.

Fleeting reference to federal claim in state Habeas petition did not exhaust the claim.

A series of smaller federal claims can't be accumulated into a viable, freestanding one.

Sufficient evidence.

No Strickland error where deft's lawyer elicits fact of prior convictions, doesn't preserve objection to admission of deft's statement to police.

Michael Norris v. Lorie Davis, Director

Fourth Circuit: In Re: Terrence Wright

Habeas, AEDPA

As the state prisoner Habeas statute is more specific than the general federal Habeas statute, petitions relating to the incarceration that do not challenge the underlying conviction arise under the state prisoner Habeas statute.  Circuit split flagged.

Where the claim was available to the petitioner at the time of an earlier petition, pre-AEDPA abuse-of-writ principles justify denial of the writ.

In Re: Terrence Wright

Eighth Circuit: Raphael Donnell v. United States

AEDPA, Sentencing

Challenge to advisory sentencing guideline is merely suggested by Supreme Court holding on mandatory sentencing guideline, not compelled by it, so the petition is barred as second/successive.

Raphael Donnell  v.  United States

Fourth Circuit: In re: John McFadden

Habeas/AEDPA

Newly discovered evidence that deft lost out on a favorable plea offer is not grounds for a second/successive petition.


In re: John McFadden