Second or successive habeas petitions from prisoners in federal custody must meet the same statutory thresholds as do those from state prisoners.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/18/18-40270-CV0.pdf
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Showing posts with label AEDPA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AEDPA. Show all posts
Tenth Circuit: Grissom v. Carpenter
Trial counsel's arguments in mitigation phase at capital trial largely covered the ground that a closer examination of petitioner's undiagnosed brain damage would have led to, so state habeas ruling that representation was not constitutionally ineffective was not an unreasonable one.
Defense counsel's concession of the elements of the crime made instruction on lesser-included offenses redundant, and was apparently a legitimate strategic decision to focus the jury's attention on mitigation. As defendants cannot withdraw a defense, apparently stipulating to the elements shouldn't waive the instruction. Voluntary intoxication instruction was not prejudicial, given the high standard for relief under state law, and exists as a complete defense, not a mitigation. State habeas denial was therefore not unreasonable.
State habeas denial for cumulative error, presumably referencing ineffective assistance for the lack of lesser-included instruction and mitigation, was not unreasonable and contrary to law; de novo review of the total record in federal habeas can establish this.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/16/16-6271.pdf
Defense counsel's concession of the elements of the crime made instruction on lesser-included offenses redundant, and was apparently a legitimate strategic decision to focus the jury's attention on mitigation. As defendants cannot withdraw a defense, apparently stipulating to the elements shouldn't waive the instruction. Voluntary intoxication instruction was not prejudicial, given the high standard for relief under state law, and exists as a complete defense, not a mitigation. State habeas denial was therefore not unreasonable.
State habeas denial for cumulative error, presumably referencing ineffective assistance for the lack of lesser-included instruction and mitigation, was not unreasonable and contrary to law; de novo review of the total record in federal habeas can establish this.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/16/16-6271.pdf
Third Circuit: Edward Mitchell v. Superintendent Dallas SCI
Although co-deft was correctly granted the writ on question of severance at trial, a subsequent change in the law has established that there was no confrontation clause issue requiring severance, and since the present petitioner is not being held in violation of the law, Habeas would not run.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/173118p.pdf
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/173118p.pdf
Third Circuit: USA v. Anthony Mayo
A second or successive habeas petition will be entertained if the sentence challenged may have been based on the retroactively invalidated sentencing provision.
State statute is categorically not a valid predicate crime of violence, as it can be committed by an omission.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/164282p.pdf
State statute is categorically not a valid predicate crime of violence, as it can be committed by an omission.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/164282p.pdf
Seventh Circuit: Volney McGhee v. Cameron Watson
Where ineffective assistance at trial isn't used to establish ineffective assistance on direct review, state habeas petition for ineffective assistance on direct review does not exhaust the ineffective assistance at trial for subsequent federal habeas review.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D08-17/C:15-3881:J:Wood:con:T:fnOp:N:2203949:S:0
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D08-17/C:15-3881:J:Wood:con:T:fnOp:N:2203949:S:0
Sixth Circuit: Ian Davis v. Margaret Bradshaw
Recantation of trial witness insufficiently credible to trigger the actual-innocence exception to the statutory limitation on Habeas petitions.
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0172p-06.pdf
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0172p-06.pdf
Third Circuit: USA v. Roy Green
Supreme Court's holding that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutionally vague did not announce a new constitutional rule that would justify the appeal of sentences under any compulsory residual sentencing scheme; this is established in part by the subsequent holding of the Court that advisory residual sentencing schemes are not unconstitutionally vague. Circuit split flagged.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/172906p.pdf
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/172906p.pdf
Third Circuit: Seifullah Abdul-Salaam v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
As there was no indication that pursuing expert mitigation testimony in the penalty phase would cause conflicting narratives or a relitigation of the guilt phase, omitting to investigate the potential mitigation produced ineffective assistance of counsel; state appellate review to the contrary was unreasonable.
Where the state courts explicitly do not reach consideration of the prejudice arising from the ineffective assistance, federal habeas approaches the question de novo.
District court erred in determining that the mitigation would have been cumulative in light of the guilt-phase evidence; as the potential mitigation was qualitatively different, it is likely that at least one juror would have been swayed by a fundamentally different presentation in the penalty phase.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/149001p.pdf
Where the state courts explicitly do not reach consideration of the prejudice arising from the ineffective assistance, federal habeas approaches the question de novo.
District court erred in determining that the mitigation would have been cumulative in light of the guilt-phase evidence; as the potential mitigation was qualitatively different, it is likely that at least one juror would have been swayed by a fundamentally different presentation in the penalty phase.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/149001p.pdf
Ninth Circuit: White v. Ryan
State habeas denial was contrary to and an unreasonable application of the federal law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims as to mitigation and aggravating factors, since it considered whether the specific court that had heard the case would have been prejudiced, rather than a neutral and objective court considered abstractly, and also did not weigh the cumulative effect of the mitigation that had been omitted.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/07/11/15-99011.pdf
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/07/11/15-99011.pdf
Fifth Circuit: William Erickson v. Lorie Davis, Director
State court judgment became final and the clock for federal habeas began to run after the period for challenging the state appellate decision in the Supreme Court ran out, not after the state judgment on remand became final.
Second Circuit: Massey v. United States
Habeas petition is untimely when petitioner was sentenced under an earlier-abrogated provision of the law that established certain crimes as predicate convictions based on the use of force, but petitions for relief under a subsequent holding of the Supreme Court as to the residual clause of the same law, since only the latter announced a substantive change in the law.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/d97b88cf-c722-4c12-a6fc-67b8ddb371fe/1/doc/17-1676_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/d97b88cf-c722-4c12-a6fc-67b8ddb371fe/1/hilite/
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/d97b88cf-c722-4c12-a6fc-67b8ddb371fe/1/doc/17-1676_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/d97b88cf-c722-4c12-a6fc-67b8ddb371fe/1/hilite/
Ninth Circuit: Tamplin v. Muniz
Petitioner's desire to represent himself was sufficiently unequivocal in rejecting all public defenders and stating that he couldn't afford private counsel. State Habeas denial grounded on the timeliness of the request for self representation was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal constitutional law, as there was a clear right to self-representation, since the request was made some weeks before trial. Appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance, as second pro-se request hadn't been included in the appellate record.
Dissent: "Weeks before trial" is too vague to say that no reasonable jurist could have denied the habeas. Brief appearance of private counsel presented timing problems and put into question the unequivocal nature of the request.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/07/06/16-15832.pdf
Dissent: "Weeks before trial" is too vague to say that no reasonable jurist could have denied the habeas. Brief appearance of private counsel presented timing problems and put into question the unequivocal nature of the request.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/07/06/16-15832.pdf
Tenth Circuit: Underwood v. Royal
No ineffective assistance in not presenting forensic evidence, as omission of gruesome details might have been a sound trial strategy.
Prosecutor's remarks in closing about condition of victim did not unduly prejudice the verdict.
Approved instructions did not prejudicially suggest restrictions on mitigating circumstances.
Admission of victim's parents sentencing recommendations cannot in itself rise to structural error, and was not an error in the aggregate; such muted, one-off pleas do not warrant the writ.
State appellate decision that the jury did not need to find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/16/16-6262.pdf
Prosecutor's remarks in closing about condition of victim did not unduly prejudice the verdict.
Approved instructions did not prejudicially suggest restrictions on mitigating circumstances.
Admission of victim's parents sentencing recommendations cannot in itself rise to structural error, and was not an error in the aggregate; such muted, one-off pleas do not warrant the writ.
State appellate decision that the jury did not need to find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/16/16-6262.pdf
Tenth Circuit: Pavatt v. Royal
Amended panel opinion after denial of en banc.
No prejudice from ineffective assistance claim based on admission of victim photos, as objection would have been useless under res judicata -- similar photos previously held admissible in another case.
Aggravating circumstance of victim suffering was imposed using an unconstitutionally broad standard for potential suffering, state habeas to contrary was an unreasonable application of the law.
Dissent:
Ineffective assistance claims generally procedurally barred, as state provided time to raise them
A reasonable finder of fact might have determined that victim suffered, regardless of how broad the potential application of the standard might be.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-6117.pdf
No prejudice from ineffective assistance claim based on admission of victim photos, as objection would have been useless under res judicata -- similar photos previously held admissible in another case.
Aggravating circumstance of victim suffering was imposed using an unconstitutionally broad standard for potential suffering, state habeas to contrary was an unreasonable application of the law.
Dissent:
Ineffective assistance claims generally procedurally barred, as state provided time to raise them
A reasonable finder of fact might have determined that victim suffered, regardless of how broad the potential application of the standard might be.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-6117.pdf
Eighth Circuit: Santos Rosales-Martinez v. Nick Ludwick
State court's re-imposition of limits on the confrontation of a witness during retrial after simply adopting the findings of the previous proceeding is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law on the subject.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/171910P.pdf
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/171910P.pdf
Seventh Circuit: Wendell Weaver v. Walter Nicholson
State Habeas court reasonably applied governing precedent in holding that disqualification of deft's chosen counsel due to representation of potential prosecution witness didn't violate the right; the third party representation here was much closer than in the precedent to the contrary.
Trial counsel not crossing on a particular point didn't prejudice the petitioner, as the witness' credibility was attacked elsewhere.
Petitioner didn't show that trial counsel didn't investigate a potential witness, merely that the witness wasn't called, which must be presumed to be a strategic decision.
Claim based in reported statements of witness who died shortly afterwards was procedurally defaulted for not being raised on direct review, and would have been considered inadmissible hearsay under governing Supreme Court precedent.
Pre-trial inconsistencies and post-trial recantation insufficient to establish Due Process violation for prosecution witness' perjury, given state court finding to contrary.
Admission of prior bad acts claim procedurally defaulted.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-15/C:16-2400:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:2171664:S:0
Trial counsel not crossing on a particular point didn't prejudice the petitioner, as the witness' credibility was attacked elsewhere.
Petitioner didn't show that trial counsel didn't investigate a potential witness, merely that the witness wasn't called, which must be presumed to be a strategic decision.
Claim based in reported statements of witness who died shortly afterwards was procedurally defaulted for not being raised on direct review, and would have been considered inadmissible hearsay under governing Supreme Court precedent.
Pre-trial inconsistencies and post-trial recantation insufficient to establish Due Process violation for prosecution witness' perjury, given state court finding to contrary.
Admission of prior bad acts claim procedurally defaulted.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-15/C:16-2400:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:2171664:S:0
Fifth Circuit: Edward Busby v. Lorie Davis, Director
Assertion of actual innocence in a second state Habeas that was dismissed summarily with an indication that the court did not reach the merits was not dismissed for procedural default, as the briefing indicates (which would at any rate be a reasonable ruling, since Federal courts are permitted to do such things), but for the alternate reason in the statute, namely that no reasonable juror would have accepted the claim. As this alternate ground is not challenged, the state denial was not an unreasonable application of facts or federal law.
Second non-AEDPA federal Habeas asserting identical claims is denied on merits.
Ineffective Assistance claim based on direct appeal was not raised in initial state Habeas -- ineffective assistance in collateral proceedings is insufficient excuse for the default of claim, as there is no right to counsel at that stage.
No prejudice from ineffective assistance at trial.
Editorial note: End the death penalty.
Ninth Circuit: Ellis v. Harrison
State court's holding that Habeas petitioner must establish prejudice from his counsel's racial animus by a preponderance was an unreasonable application of federal constitutional law.
To establish prejudice from counsel's racial animus, petitioner must establish either his or her knowledge of the animus at a critical phase of the proceedings, resulting in a communications breakdown, or another adverse effect of the animus.
Concurrence to per curiam: prejudice should be the presumption in strategic decisions once animus is established.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/07/16-56188.pdf
To establish prejudice from counsel's racial animus, petitioner must establish either his or her knowledge of the animus at a critical phase of the proceedings, resulting in a communications breakdown, or another adverse effect of the animus.
Concurrence to per curiam: prejudice should be the presumption in strategic decisions once animus is established.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/07/16-56188.pdf
Seventh Circuit: Carl Leo Davis v. US
The Supreme Court's holding that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutionally vague announced a substantive change in the law that applies to petitioners seeking collateral review of sentences imposed under a parallel provision of the mandatory sentencing guidelines, despite the Supreme Court's subsequent holding that the provision in the guidelines was constitutional, as the gudelines, in the interval, had become merely advisory.
This substantive shift in the law was a sharp reversal from precedent, legitimately causing the petitioners not to raise the issue on direct appeal.
A second substantive change in the law that removed an alternate basis for the sentence of one of the petitioners did not trigger a mandatory limitation period for filing the writ, as it would merely have shifted the ultimate basis for the sentence.
A plea deal carve out excepting any constitutionally impermissible factor incorporates any unconstitutional input present at sentencing.
Prior offenses should be considered categorically when deciding whether the conviction is a valid predicate.
(Important decision. Again, all this is quick work. Don't rely.)
Eleventh Circuit:Alfonso Ponton v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
Where a court recharacterizes a pleading as a habeas filing without informing the deft/petitioner, the petition does not count towards the statutory limit on second and successive findings; this rule applies to initial filings that predate the supreme court decision that established the rule.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201610683.pdf
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