Court, acting as a fiduciary for the class, didn't err in accepting a settlement of a class action as fair, reasonable, and adequate. Plaintiffs couldn't substantiate number of affected customers who were categorically ineligible under the settlement. Order sufficiently reasoned, terms could have been acceptable to reasonable counsel.
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Ninth Circuit: Brandon Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., et al.
No specific jurisdiction over web payment service operator, as the harm doesn't arise out of conduct expressly aimed at the state; the company is a broadly accessible web platform indifferent to the location of its customers and the consumers affected.
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Michael Goforth
Given another circuit's on-point precedent (with a novel definition of the generic crime), a state kidnapping statute is a valid predicate, as the state court decision that expanded the bounds of the statute beyond those of the generic crime did so in dicta, after first determining that the conduct satisfied the state statute.
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Aaron Broussard
Plain error review, as deft's pro se pretrial motion to exclude was denied with an invitation to object at trial, and later standby counsel didn't object or preserve the claim. Introduction of photographs of victims of mail-order pharmacy wasn't plain error.
Seventh Circuit: Roy Sargeant v. Aracelie Barfield
Plaintiff's 8A claim appropriately preserved when 1A claim was screened out, as the screening operated as an interlocutory order, and the underlying facts of the claim established the 8A claim.
A Bivens remedy for not protecting a prisoner is unavailable, as the only Supreme Court precedent recognizing the claim was sub silento; it's therefore a novel claim, and the existing statutory and administrative scheme suffices to establish that Congress might think itself best placed to resolve the procedures.
DISSENT:
Sub silento Supreme Court holding suffices, given the facts of the case and lower courts' recognition of it. Even absent that, it's not a new context, and no special factors counsel against recognition of the judicial remedy. Bivens grounded in constitutional necessity.
Sixth Circuit: United States v. Yun Zheng
Given the terms of the current statute, harboring an alien doesn't require specific intent; rather, it proscribes conduct that substantially facilitates remaining and avoiding detection, either knowingly or in reckless disregard of the risk. Circuit precedent on the term doesn't bind, as the changes to the underlying statute have been significant. Error would be harmless anyway, as the aliens being in plain view wouldn't exculpate. Instructions didn't invade 6A territory of the jury.
Sixth Circuit: United States v. Clarence Goodwin
No procedural error in review of sentence, as the retroactive element of the law only reduced the minimum term, not the guidelines range, and the court adequately recited that it had considered the petitioner's arguments. The reliance on the career-offender sentencing consideration to reach the guidelines range under the new calculation didn't offend Due Process.
Substantively, bootstrapping a challenge to the career-offender calculations to the retroactive changes would be unfair to those who were sentenced only under the former.
DISSENT:
Career-offender guidelines are tied to the maximum sentence, which, although not made retroactive here, would be different under the new statute; court's explanations did not demonstrate that it understood the complexity of the deft's claims.
Fourth Circuit: In re: Caryn Strickland
Mandamus for trial scheduling neither justified nor prudent, as the statute only establishes that the court need give priority to the claim, and the court's offer of a trial prior to full discovery, as well as the petitioner's agreement to defer proceedings for arbitration, suffice to establish that the claim was being promptly addressed.
(Entire circuit recused, panel from outside.)
Fourth Circuit: US v. Gregory Brantley
The time limit for appealing un-pronounced elements of the sentence is a mandatory claims-processing rule, and since the govt timely requested dismissal, equitable waiver is unavailable. Deft's analogy to appeal waivers inapposite, since in that case, imposition of sentence happens after (otherwise appealable) judgment is issued. Terms of a judgment are presumptively binding, and deft was put on notice of them when judgment issued.
Second Circuit: United States v. Calk
Bank officer's approval of loans in hopes of a Presidential appointment was illegal, as, for purposes of the statute, corrupt conduct need only be motivated at least in part by improper motives, and commercial decisions that might offer legitimate benefits are not insulated from the inquiry. The thing of value at issue need not have pecuniary value. The value of the intangible thing at issue can be determined to exceed the statutory minimum by establishing its value to the deft.
The grand jury subpoena of a third party wasn't improper; although the suspicious timing was enough to shift the burden, the subsequent superseding indictment, among other things, established its legitimacy.
Second Circuit: United States ex rel. Weiner et al. v. Siemens AG et al.
As the qui tam statute references both the unsealing of the complaint and the court's direction to serve the defendant, the clock for serving the defendant did not begin to run until the court ordered service.
First Circuit: Ciarametaro v. City of Gloucester
As city officials might reasonably have concluded that the value of the harbormaster's expert testimony was outweighed by the city's interests, the right to testify in the matter was not clearly established, and the officials are entitled to qualified immunity.
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