Motion to shift the ground from per se violation to rule of reason was properly construed as a motion to dismiss the indictment, as it would have been an impermissible constructive amendment of the indictment.
Where two parties are alleged to have engaged in bid-rigging, and also relate vertically as supplier and contractor for awarded bids, the alleged conduct isn't an inherently anticompetitive restraint on trade subject to per se analysis. Precedent requires that the companies be considered in their totality, so the horizontal bid-rigging isn't separable from the supply relationship.
Expert testimony as to the anticompetitive effects of the business practices should not have been excluded when considering a (constructive) motion to dismiss.
By ensuring that their competitor/distributor won the bidding war, the bidder could increase the demand for the supplier's product.
Fraud convictions for submitting a noncompetitive bid were not infected by the Sherman Act instructions reversed here.