Eleventh Circuit: USA v. Kendrick Eugene Duldulao, et al.

 Although the conspiracy instruction might have been faulty, a prior panel held that it sufficiently conveyed the mens rea required for culpability, and circuit precedent can't be changed within the circuit absent en banc review. Circuit precedent to contrary was for general offense of conspiracy, rather than specific statute.

Although the other challenged instruction was suggested by the deft at trial (in accordance with longstanding precedent), subsequent changes in the caselaw are an exception to the invited-error doctrine, and sufficient under plain error review.

Sufficient evidence for conviction.  Expert medical testimony on appropriate standard of care, even when dispositive, wasn't plain error.

USA v. Kendrick Eugene Duldulao, et al.

Tenth Circuit: Team Industrial Services v. Zurich American Insurance Company, et al.

 Second company that assumed the obligations of a first company by a series of agreements consolidating and retiring the earlier agreements was not covered under the insurance of the counterparty, as the new agreements set such coverage at the discretion of the counterparty.  Use of the first company's credentials by the second company to file insurance paperwork insufficient to offset.  No cause for reformation absent evidence that the counterparty had any other intent.  If there was a fiduciary duty of the counterparty, it was owed only to the first company.  Promissory estoppel unjustified.

Team Industrial Services v. Zurich American Insurance Company, et al.

Ninth Circuit: Tellez-Ramirez v. Garland

Under modified categorical review, the state drug statute is a valid immigration predicate.  The list of drug classes doesn't establish several means of committing a single crime in itself, but is rather a list of  elements establishing distinct violations--this is due to the varying lengths of sentence, caselaw referencing the need to prove specific substances within a single class, and the fact that the specific illicit substance is named within the jury instructions.  

The overbreadth of the state statute relative to the federal crime doesn't import a similar overbreadth into the mens rea; a belief that the substance was proscribed under state law would suffice for a state conviction that could pass Immigration muster, as the state mens rea and federal mens rea requirements are identical.

State caselaw incorporating solicitation into aiding and abetting, and under which, by statute, the conduct is culpable as the conduct of a principal under the specific state statute doesn't make the specific state statute broader than the federal version, since solicitation alone would be an inchoate offense distinct from an accessory's conviction as a principal under the specific statute, which would require a completed offense--not mere solicitation.

Tellez-Ramirez v. Garland

Sixth Circuit: In re: Cal. Palms Addiction Recovery Campus, Inc.

Shifting the bankruptcy proceeding to another statutory title for purposes of liquidation finalized the rights of the parties with significant and irreparable consequences, so the order is sufficiently final for purposes of appeal.

Court did not abuse its discretion in moving to liquidation, despite the possibility that the order would diminish the party's ability to recover funds in pending lawsuits, given concerns about the management of the estate.

Party insufficiently prejudiced by two-day violation of notice requirement. Lack of counsel at hearing not prejudicial, as there was no objection to withdrawal or request for continuance.

Cal. Palms Addiction Recovery Campus, Inc.

Fifth Circuit: Sligh v. City of Conroe

Police dog's directed attack was a violation of pedestrian's constitutional rights, but not a clearly established violation of constitutional rights for liability purposes, since precedent cited was of a non-resisting suspect.  Similarly, claims against bystander officers and the municipality were not against clearly established law.  Police knowledge that pedestrian was a mental patient insufficient for a claim under the disability act.

Sligh v. City of Conroe

Fourth Circuit: US v. Dearnta Thomas

 The federal racketeering violence statute is a crime in itself, and satisfies the requirements for a crime of violence without looking through the statute to the underlying state-law predicates of the conviction.

US v. Dearnta Thomas

Eleventh Circuit: Robert Ponzio, et al v. Emily Pinon, et al

 Court, acting as a fiduciary for the class, didn't err in accepting a settlement of a class action as fair, reasonable, and adequate.  Plaintiffs couldn't substantiate number of affected customers who were categorically ineligible under the settlement. Order sufficiently reasoned, terms could have been acceptable to reasonable counsel.

Robert Ponzio, et al v. Emily Pinon, et al 

Ninth Circuit: Brandon Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., et al.

No specific jurisdiction over web payment service operator, as the harm doesn't arise out of conduct expressly aimed at the state; the company is a broadly accessible web platform indifferent to the location of its customers and the consumers affected.

Brandon Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., et al.

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Michael Goforth

 

Given another circuit's on-point precedent (with a novel definition of the generic crime), a state kidnapping statute is a valid predicate, as the state court decision that expanded the bounds of the statute beyond those of the generic crime did so in dicta, after first determining that the conduct satisfied the state statute.

United States  v.  Michael Goforth

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Aaron Broussard

 

Plain error review, as deft's pro se pretrial motion to exclude was denied with an invitation to object at trial, and later standby counsel didn't object or preserve the claim. Introduction of photographs of victims of mail-order pharmacy wasn't plain error.

United States  v.  Aaron Broussard

Seventh Circuit: Roy Sargeant v. Aracelie Barfield

 

Plaintiff's 8A claim appropriately preserved when 1A claim was screened out, as the screening operated as an interlocutory order, and the underlying facts of the claim established the 8A claim.

A Bivens remedy for not protecting a prisoner is unavailable, as the only Supreme Court precedent recognizing the claim was sub silento; it's therefore a novel claim, and the existing statutory and administrative scheme suffices to establish that Congress might think itself best placed to resolve the procedures. 

DISSENT:

Sub silento Supreme Court holding suffices, given the facts of the case and lower courts' recognition of it.  Even absent that, it's not a new context, and no special factors counsel against recognition of the judicial remedy.  Bivens grounded in constitutional necessity.

Roy Sargeant v. Aracelie Barfield

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Yun Zheng

 

Given the terms of the current statute, harboring an alien doesn't require specific intent; rather, it proscribes conduct that substantially facilitates remaining and avoiding detection, either knowingly or in reckless disregard of the risk.   Circuit precedent on the term doesn't bind, as the changes to the underlying statute have been significant. Error would be harmless anyway, as the aliens being in plain view wouldn't exculpate.  Instructions didn't invade 6A territory of the jury.

United States v. Yun Zheng

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Clarence Goodwin

No procedural error in review of sentence, as the retroactive element of the law only reduced the minimum term, not the guidelines range, and the court adequately recited that it had considered the petitioner's arguments. The reliance on the career-offender sentencing consideration to reach the guidelines range under the new calculation didn't offend Due Process.

Substantively, bootstrapping a challenge to the career-offender calculations to the retroactive changes would be unfair to those who were sentenced only under the former.  

DISSENT:

Career-offender guidelines are tied to the maximum sentence, which, although not made retroactive here, would be different under the new statute; court's explanations did not demonstrate that it understood the complexity of the deft's claims.

United States v. Clarence Goodwin

Fourth Circuit: In re: Caryn Strickland

 

Mandamus for trial scheduling neither justified nor prudent, as the statute only establishes that the court need give priority to the claim, and the court's offer of a trial prior to full discovery, as well as the petitioner's agreement to defer proceedings for arbitration, suffice to establish that the claim was being promptly addressed.

(Entire circuit recused, panel from outside.)

In re: Caryn Strickland

Fourth Circuit: US v. Gregory Brantley

 

The time limit for appealing un-pronounced elements of the sentence is a mandatory claims-processing rule, and since the govt timely requested dismissal, equitable waiver is unavailable. Deft's analogy to appeal waivers inapposite, since in that case, imposition of sentence happens after (otherwise appealable) judgment is issued.  Terms of a judgment are presumptively binding, and deft was put on notice of them when judgment issued.

US v. Gregory Brantley

Second Circuit: United States v. Calk

 Bank officer's approval of loans in hopes of a Presidential appointment was illegal, as, for purposes of the statute, corrupt conduct need only be motivated at least in part by improper motives, and commercial decisions that might offer legitimate benefits are not insulated from the inquiry.  The thing of value at issue need not have pecuniary value. The value of the intangible thing at issue can be determined to exceed the statutory minimum by establishing its value to the deft.

The grand jury subpoena of a third party wasn't improper; although the suspicious timing was enough to shift the burden, the subsequent superseding indictment, among other things, established its legitimacy.

United States v. Calk

Second Circuit: United States ex rel. Weiner et al. v. Siemens AG et al.

 As the qui tam statute references both the unsealing of the complaint and the court's direction to serve the defendant, the clock for serving the defendant did not begin to run until the court ordered service.  

United States ex rel. Weiner et al. v. Siemens AG et al.

First Circuit: Ciarametaro v. City of Gloucester

 

As city officials might reasonably have concluded that the value of the harbormaster's expert testimony was outweighed by the city's interests, the right to testify in the matter was not clearly established, and the officials are entitled to qualified immunity.

 Ciarametaro v. City of Gloucester