Federal Circuit: Veteran Warriors v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs

 Statutory term is sufficiently vague to justify deference to the agency, as it is silent as to whether certain services need to be delivered in person, as opposed to being provided remotely.  Parallel statute distinguishing the two speaks to the ambiguity of the first statute.  

Agency's position is justified by the need for a clear rule, and is a reasonable policy choice; prior silence on the question doesn't establish that this is a reversal by the agency.  

Although the statutory context clarifies the definition of "serious injury," the statute is still sufficiently ambiguous to require deference to the agency.

Although the agency's new definition was a change from prior interpretations, it was a reasoned change that accounted for settled expectations, and not the sort of sharp break with previous readings that would justify less deference to the agency's final interpretation.

Statute defining incapacity as being unable to accomplish certain daily tasks is sufficiently vague to justify deference to the agency's reading, since it doesn't distinguish occasional incapacity from total incapacity.  Prior fee schedule implying a gradation of capacity doesn't make for a change in policy, since it refers to the amount of assistance provided, not the beneficiary's abilities unaided.

Agency erred in imposing a single definition of "in need of supervision" where the law describes two degrees of necessary supervision; additionally, the medical requirements read into the term are not logically dictated by the statute's mandate.

Law's requirement that the compensation levels be tied to geographic areas and creation of a program for assisting veterans abroad did not define the eligibility of extraterritorial caregivers; the agency's interpretation barring such caregivers is reasonable.

Agency's tying of caregiver compensation to federal civil service pay levels was a reasonable one; nothing in the act required that the compensation be linked to private sector salaries.

Agency's definition of the inability to sustain life in the community was a reasonable one; it incorporated the statutory factors.

Veteran Warriors v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs

DC Circuit: Jane Doe v. SEC

 Although the list of examples in the statute isn't explicitly an exclusive one, deference to the authoritative, considered interpretation of the agency within its competency asserting the exclusivity of the list is warranted.  Expressio unius would require an exclusive list.  

CONCURRENCE:

When a statute lists three means for accomplishing something, there are three means of accomplishing something under the statute.  Expressio unius applies.

Jane Doe v. SEC

DC Circuit: USA v. Nizar Trabelsi

 Pretrial orders denying a double jeopardy claim arising from the circumstances of extradition are sufficiently final for the purposes of appeal.

By the terms of the treaty and the act of state doctrine, the courts should primarily defer to the actions of the foreign executive rather than the actions of the foreign judiciary.

Foreign court's determination of the limits of the foreign executive's power under the order did not interpret the executive's decision or say that he was compelled to follow the instructions of the order.

Foreign executive's transmission of letter outlining terms of the extradition was not an act of state where the transmission of the letter was mandated by the foreign judiciary, and the letter notes that it is not necessarily the position of the foreign state.

CONCURRENCE:

A private right arising from a treaty can be forfeited when not timely raised.

CONCURRENCE:

Although the plain text of the treaty imposes no double jeopardy obligations on the extraditing state, an earlier holding in the case established that it imposed reciprocal obligations as to its principles; making this determination should have been the first consideration, as it implicates US separation of powers, with the courts constrained from reading general principles of international law into the terms of a treaty.

USA v. Nizar Trabelsi

Ninth Circuit: Craig Ross v. Ronald Davis

 Felony murder constitutional challenge to sentence was appropriately exhausted in state habeas, since despite the state habeas holding to the contrary, petitioner's filings on direct appeal discussed the relevant standard and sought relief.

State jury instructions on aiding and abetting didn't preclude the subsequent capital sentence, because although they didn't require the specific intent necessary under federal law, the separate finding of special circumstances established the necessary intent.

Petitioner had sufficient involvement in the crimes and evinced sufficient reckless disregard of the risk of death.

State court's determinations on ineffective assistance of counsel were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the federal standard; defense counsel's limited investigation of mitigation evidence wasn't dispositive, as it related entirely to early childhood, and defense closing contained many mitigating inferences from the evidence; the latter are appropriately considered in a Strickland claim.

Craig Ross v. Ronald Davis

Ninth Circuit: Laidlaw's Harley Davidson Sales v. Commisioner

Law requiring initial determination of tax assessment to be approved by a supervisor prior to enforcement of the penalty doesn't preclude pre-approval notice to the taxpayer that the government will enforce the penalty; the supervisor's approval must occur before the actual enforcement, but sufficiently in advance that the supervisor still has the discretion to withhold approval.

DISSENT:

By the plain language, the initial determination must be approved before it becomes the basis for agency action.

Laidlaw's Harley Davidson Sales v. Commisioner

Fifth Circuit: La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Harris Cty Repub.

 As the motion was timely and the impaired interest might not be sufficiently protected by the state's defense of the law, partisan political committees had a right to intervene in litigation challenging an election reform law.

La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Harris Cty Repub.

First Circuit: OK Resorts of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Charles Taylor Consulting Mexico, S.A. de C.V.

 Court did not abuse its discretion in granting a motion to dismiss well after the scheduled close of discovery, given the absence of supplementary filings from the non-movant.  

OK Resorts of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Charles Taylor Consulting Mexico, S.A. de C.V.

First Circuit: US v. Agramonte-Quezada

 Absent a showing of bad faith or prejudice, discovery delay in producing dog training records and logs did not require the trial judge to grant a continuance, as there were other discovery materials that might have opened the door to a challenging of the canine evidence.

Evidence of a prior canine indication was more probative than prejudicial, since the switching of vehicles in the interval and the deft's awareness of the narcotics traffic spoke to a continuing plan or scheme and rebutted the claim that he had been an unwitting courier.

Law enforcement testimony as to the usual trafficking operation wasn't impermissible overview testimony, as it came at the end of the trial, the witness was insulated from the particular case, and didn't reference any particulars.  Lay testimony of this nature gleaned from on-the-job experience is helpful to the finder of fact, and therefore permissible.

Court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding to sentencing rather than considering competency; the determination had been made earlier,and nothing in the colloquy prior to sentencing indicated sufficient incapacity. 

US v. Agramonte-Quezada

First Circuit: Cushing v. Packard

For claims arising from either of the federal statutes at issue, a suit against an officer of a state legislature in their official capacity, and in which the state is not named in the action, is against the legislator personally in their legislative capacity and doesn't implicate state sovereign immunity.

If Congress can abrogate conduct-based legislative immunity, as opposed to status-based sovereign immunity, a clear statement to that effect in the law is required.

State legislature did not waive its officers' legislative immunity from disability related discrimination  claims by accepting federal funds for the legislative session costs pursuant to a federal statute with an antidiscrimination clause.

Legislative immunity bars a suit against a state officer where the injunctive remedy would effect a change in the rules that was more than merely casually or incidentally related to legislative affairs.

Legislative immunity under the Speech and Debate clause can't be limited by the state's adoption of a less expansive standard in its own law.

Extraordinary exceptions to legislative immunity aren't available, since, among other reasons, the legislature was following independent procedural rules, rather than changing them.

DISSENT:

Purpose of the immunity is to prevent the disenfranchisement of the people.  Effective ouster and disenfranchisement of some can't therefore be immunized in the interests of protecting others. Only immunizing conduct that isn't facially discriminatory opens the door to facially neutral but discriminatory rulemaking.

Cushing v. Packard