Eighth Circuit: Ascente Business Consulting v. DR myCommerce

 

Proof that a company had certain knowledge prior to its employees' contrary statements is insufficient to state a fraud or fraud-adjacent claim under the state's heightened pleading rules.  

Evidence that work stopped after a certain meeting can't speak to the mindset of statements made at that meeting.  Evidence of a contrary financial interest is at most only a factor, as is the amount of work that it would have taken to accomplish the task.

Expert testimony on ambiguity of contract terms is inadmissible, as ambiguity is a legal conclusion.

Given testimony that the overruns were paid to preserve the business relationship, there was no question for trial on the reliance on the underlying representations. Under state law, the counterparty's expectations of the plaintiff's reliance are insufficient to establish the plaintiff's reliance.


http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/21/08/202474P.pdf

Eighth Circuit: Anthony Vines v. Welspun Pipes Inc.

 

Court did not clearly err in refusing to sanction a settlement under the statute due to the fact that the attorneys' fees had not been negotiated separately from the underlying claim, given the simultaneous negotiation in emails, calculation of fee on the basis of the the case proceeding without settlement, and implicit tying of the agreement on fees to the agreement on the underlying claim.

Award of de minimis attorneys' fees was an abuse of discretion, as the amount must be determined by determination of the lodestar value by multiplying the hours and the rate.

Given that the only rmaining matter is the calculation of attorneys' fees, no plain error sufficient to reassign on remand.

DISSENT:

Negotiating a wage claim simultaneously with the fees creates a significant conflict of interest.   Plaintiffs counsel, in fee negotiations, said that deft was getting a "pretty sweet deal."  Court below held that lodestar was inapplicable on this record.


http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/21/08/202168P.pdf

Eighth Circuit: Ka'Torah Prowse v. Walter Washington

 

When an administrative appeal is filed under the statute, and the petitioner maintains that the papers were filed on certain dates and in a certain order, but this is contradicted by the receipt stamps on the documents, the issue presents a question for trial; the date stamps are not dispositive.


https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/21/08/201995P.pdf

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Clarence Robinson

 

Existence of a second statutory basis, based on the drug quantity determinations made during sentencing, for the life sentence imposed at original sentencing does not make the petitioner ineligible for relief under the statute.  Since the statute looks to the offense of conviction and not the underlying facts, the sentence imposed for the offense of conviction should be modified.

DISSENT:

Given the findings, the petitioner would have been sentenced under the second statutory basis at the original sentencing, which makes him ineligible for relief.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/21/08/201947P.pdf

Eighth Circuit: Scott McLaughlin v. Anne Precythe

 

Although a simple Google search would likely have revealed the impeachment evidence against the defense expert witness in a capital case, not investigating the witness beyond a reasoble reliance on the judgment of the professional commnity was not ineffective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner wasn't prejudiced by lack of replacement psychologist's testimony, a witness who would have provided evidence on an aggravating factor on which the jury ended up not being able to reach a decision, since from a legal point of view the testimony would have been duplicative of the overwhelming evidence on this point; there was therefore not a substantial likelihood of a different result.

AEDPA deference to state habeas finding to the contrary offers an independent ground for overruling the district court ruling that petitioner was prejudiced by the lack of testimony.

Since the ineffective assistance claim wasn't substantial, petitioner can't raise it in federal habeas after defaulting in state habeas, since excuse of default requires a substantial claim.

While jury instructions can't require that a jury be unanimous on any one mitigating factor, they can require that the jury be unanimous in its decision that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors.

District Court erred in holding that the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances was a finding of fact upon which the legislature had conditioned an increased punishment and that therefore must be performed by the jury, since the supreme court of the state has held in this case that the same precedent referenced by the district court was inapplicable.

CONCURRENCE:

Although the investigation of the expert witness was insufficient, there was no prejudice, given the other evidence offered.  

State supreme court has held that only the existence of a single mitigating factor need be found by the jury under the statutue, as it constitutes eligibility for the increased sentence.


http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/21/08/183510P.pdf

Seventh Circuit: Frances Rogers v. CIR

 

Innocent Spouse relief unavailable when the spouse in question is represented by counsel in a formal proceeding (even if that counsel is their spouse), attends the entire proceeding, and is highly educated.

When assessing standard of living when determining if the spouse had a duty to inquire about the questionable tax filings, the relevant consideration is whether there was a substantial increase in the standard of living, not whether it was generally high.

A legally sophisticated party's affidavit claiming that there was no conflict in being represented by their spouse in a tax case involving a jointly filed return waives a subsequent right to a new trial based on evidence that their counsel allegedly didn't call witnesses that would support the legally sophisticated party's claim to Innocent Spouse relief.

https://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2021/D08-17/C:20-2789:J:Scudder:aut:T:fnOp:N:2748862:S:0


Sixth Circuit: James Williams v. Brian Maurer

 

Since the defts didn't move for summary judgment on the False Arrest claim along with the plaintiff in the S1983 claim, summary judgment for the plaintiff isn't reviewable at the interlocutory stage, since it doesn't relate to the assertion of qualified immunity.  Pendent jurisdiction would be inapporpriate, as the False Arrest claim isn't logically subsumed in the related claim being decided in the present appeal.

Claim arising from nighttime warrantless entry under exigent circumstances presents a genuine issue for the finder of fact, since the tip leading to the entry was anonymous, not specific as to location, and was only superficially corroborated.  Warrantless entry without reaonable belief of exigent circumstances violates clearly established law.

A claim arising from excessive force asks whether the level of force used was gratuitous, not at the level of injury that the plaintiff sustained.  The right to be free of excessive force used in an unconstitutional warrantless forced entry is clearly established.


https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0184p-06.pdf

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Edmund Phillips

 

As the statute doesn't limit the post-sentencing review of restitution interest charges, and the most logical reading of the circumstance is that a petition arising from changed circumstances is unlikely to happen at sentencing, the court erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to modify an interest obligation after sentencing.

Extensive review of statute's structure and history.


https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0185p-06.pdf

Sixth Circuit: Laura Canaday v. The Anthem Companies, Inc.

 

As the statute makes no provision for nationwide service of process, Due Process requires that the statutory joinder of out of state parties to a statutory collective action prove sufficient minimum contacts of the original deft within each forum state of the out of state parties.

DISSENT

The addition of new plaintiffs doesn't change the singularity of the lawsuit, within which the court has already acquired its specific jurisdiction.  Alternatively, the deft's conduct towards the out of state plaintiffs relates to its conduct within the original forum state.

As it's a national statute, interests of particular states aren't implicated in the same way.

The statute's designation of added plaintiffs as parties is merely to distinguish their status from that of representatives without a personal interest.


https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0186p-06.pdf

Fifth Circuit: United Steel, Paper and Forest v. Anderson

 

As none of the comparators had records as bad as that of the plaintiff, and all of the other plaintiffs derived their interest from the plaintiff's claim, the issue of pretextual justification doesn't present a question for trial.

Equal Protection claim on behalf of the association to which plaintiff belonged is precluded by Supreme Court precedent as a class-of-one claim given the context of discretionary public employment.

Mere assertion that state officers granted immunity by the district court were acting outside the scope of their duties and not in good faith constitutes a forfeiture of the issue on appeal due to lack of argument.


https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-50501-CV0.pdf



Fifth Circuit: Ledford v. Keen, et al

 

The claim that the directors of the rodeo corporation had run the corporation as a sham and therefore that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling when adding the directors to her claim adequately stated a claim for relief, but under governing state law, undercapitalization alone is insufficient to establish that the corporation was a liability shell subject to veil-piercing.

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-50650-CV0.pdf



Third Circuit: Dianoias Eatery LLC v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co

 

The existence of unfiled potential legal claims arising from the same circumstances does not mean that a court lacks statutory jurisdiction to issue a requested declaratory judgment; under the statute, such claims aren't waived by seeking declaratory judgment as to the allocation of rights and responsibilities, and can be raised in a subsequent action.

Circuit precedent requiring the court to consider the redress from a federal court judgment doesn't implicate the effect of federal rulings on state law, but looks to the ability of a court to accord final relief to the parties.

Circuit precedent requiring the consideration of the litigation of identical issues in state court assumes identity of parties as well.

Even within the context of the pandemic, the issues raised here are generic issues of contract and policy exclusion interpretation, making a prudential remand on the ground of undetermined state law unjustified.

Since the state courts have no legislative priority in matters of public health, balancing policy exclusions against state public policy interests is not peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the state courts.

DISSENT

Factors relevant to prudential abstention aren't exhaustive; states need to fashion a comprehensive plan to recover from the pandemic; federal speculation on state law risks undue delay.


https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/202954p.pdf

Third Circuit: Insurance Co of the State of Pennsylvania v. Alfred T. Giuliano

 

The suretyship for the construction contract was not discharged at tender letter, occupancy, or final completion nof the structure, but by the final payments to the completion contractor; the obligee therefore held the superior interest to the assets of the defaulting party, and could waive its claim to the defaulting party's tax refund.

Settlement order explicitly referencing the tax refund and holding that nothing in the settlement could limit any interest of the surety in the refund preserved no interest, as the suretyship had not acquired its priority interest prior to the settlement agreement.

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/203057p.pdf


Second Circuit: Connecticut Parents Union v. Russell-Tucker et al.

 

An advocacy organization seeking organizational standing to challenge a government action can't merely rely on its expenditure of funds in opposition to the measure, even at the request of its members; it must establish an injury in fact by showing an involuntary material burden on its established core activities.

Claim for expenditures against the measure needs to be supported by proof that existing activies were hindered, and that the expenditures were material.


https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/748b2117-a5a7-43e5-a2d7-29a6eab2bab0/1/doc/20-1998_amd_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/748b2117-a5a7-43e5-a2d7-29a6eab2bab0/1/hilite/

Second Circuit: United States of America v. Sinmyah Amera Ceasar

 

Trial court abused its discretion by considering the need for healthcare and rehabilitation nearly to the exclusion of other sentencing factors, and without considerig the disparity between the deft's sentence and those of defts with similar backgrounds who committed similar crimes.  The deft's situation is distinguished from that of other individuals with disproportionately lenient sentences by deft's lack of cooperation and violations of pre-sentence release.

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/748b2117-a5a7-43e5-a2d7-29a6eab2bab0/2/doc/19-2881_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/748b2117-a5a7-43e5-a2d7-29a6eab2bab0/2/hilite/

Second Circuit: Revitalizing Auto Cmtys. Env’t Response Tr. v. Nat’l Grid USA

 

Under the FRCP, an entity (such as a trust) might be the real party in interest, but lack legal capacity to sue.

Under the state's law, the trust has no capacity to sue, since it is viewed as a fiduciary relationship rather than a distinct entity.  Additionally, the trust's organic docments vest legal capacity in the trustee.

Upon determination that the party lacks legal capacity, it is possible to remand with that finding on the expectation that the complaint will be amended.

A claim for both past and prospective costs incurred is prudentially ripe if the past costs are enough to sustain the claim, even though a ruling might bind the parties as to future costs incurred.

Contribution claim under a different section of the law was dismissed pendant to the dismissal of the earlier claim, and therefore unreasoned in light of the plaintiff prevailing on appeal; the case is remanded with both the contribution and recovery claims, and the District Court has the discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction  over any re-filed state law claims.

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/748b2117-a5a7-43e5-a2d7-29a6eab2bab0/3/doc/20-1931_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/748b2117-a5a7-43e5-a2d7-29a6eab2bab0/3/hilite/