Federal Circuit: Akpeneye v. US

 

The appropriate test in this context for work under the statute is whether there are either substantial duties or a substantial amount of time and effort controlled or required by the employer and primarily for the benefit of the company, rather than whether there is complete relief from duty.

Legal conclusions given in deposition testimony on employment conditions are presumptively not binding on the deponent entity.

While standby duties can rise to the level of actual work, here, since duty posts were covered, breaks could be taken away from public access, and there was a system for compensating employees if both break times during the day were interrupted, the standby duties didn't justify a clam for overtime.

Restriction that the employees had to remain in uniform and on the premises did not cause their breaks to primarily benefit the employer.flsa

Akpeneye v. US

Eleventh Circuit: Betty M. Smith, et al v. Michael Bokor

 

Since citizenship for purposes of the local controversy exception and discretionary exception to the class-action statute is based on current domicile, court clearly erred in using demographic data of past residence in a care facility as sufficient proof of citizenship. Commonsense inference that locals tend to enter nearby homes and that few of those over 65 move out of Florida are insufficient.

Plaintiff satisfied the "significant defendant" standard even absent a showing of means, since the statute requires a party against whom significant relief may be sought, not a party against whom a significant judgment may be recovered. 

A corporation liable through vicarious liability can be a primary defendant for purpose of the CAFA discretionary exception.class

Betty M. Smith, et al v. Michael Bokor

Ninth Circuit: Walden v. Shinn

 

As the state supreme court, in affirming a denial of severance on direct review, held in the alternative that the evidence of the crimes would be cross-admissible, and this ground wan't challenged on grounds of federal law during state post-conviction proceedings, the omission of the challenge from the federal Habeas petition to the District Court waived the claim.

State court determinations that post-identification police disclosures to witnesses at photo lineup that they had arrested the suspect was not contrary to clear federal law on the question.

State court reasonably declined to infer improper suggestion when photo lineup witness identified one candidate, and the police then momentarily turned off the recording device before the witness identified the defendant.

Since the state's highest court conducted an independent review of mitigation, a federal Habeas claim against the state trial court's holding of insufficient nexus needed to identify the constitutional error in the higher court's analysis.

District court properly denied amendment of federal Habeas ineffective assistance claims subsequent to independent exhaustion in state post-conviction review after federal Habeas had commenced, since the claims did not relate to the same transactions and occurrences; no plain error in the denial of equitable tolling.

State court's determination that admission of crime scene photos was not unduly prejudicial was not an unreasonable application of federal law, since contemporaneous circuit precedent held that there was no circumstance in which admission of irrelevant or prejudicial evidence could justify the writ.  Offered stipulation was not sufficient, since nothing in the Due Process Clause holds that the government can't introduce relevant evidence on an uncontested point. 

Walden v. Shinn

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Benjamin Yackel

 

As both the state crime of aiding and abetting and the federal application of the generic offense require intentionality but contemplate presence as a means of establishing intention, the state statute is a crime of violence under the Guidelines and ACCA.

United States  v.  Benjamin Yackel

Eighth Circuit: Metropolitan Omaha Property v. City of Omaha, Nebraska

 

Municipal ordinance authorizing the inspection of a property and reciting that the inspector may seek a warrant if consent cannot be obtained doesn't violate the Fourth Amendment by authorizing warrantless entry, since under the state's rules of statutory construction, the permissive power to seek a warrant would be exercised prior to any search without consent.

As there is sufficient specificity and adequate provisions for notice and appeal, the enforcement provision is not unconstitutionally vague.

Judicial consent decree explicitly allowed for changes in the municipal code, so the procedures aren't an unlawful amendment of it.

Allegation of discrimination under federal housing law doesn't plead an intensity of discrimination sufficient to state a claim.

Metropolitan Omaha Property  v.  City of Omaha, Nebraska

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Nkajlo Vangh

 

As the motion for compassionate release arises from a statute that does not require an evidentiary hearing and is discretionary in nature, there is no possible showing of entitlement to relief that could require an evidentiary hearing on the question.

Court's evaluation of the current level of care accorded the prisoner was sufficient consideration of any extraordinary and compelling justification for release, as described in the statute.

United States  v.  Nkajlo Vangh

Seventh Circuit: Shawn Patterson v. Matt Baker

 

Treating nurse's opinion on re-cross about whether visible signs of the described prison beating would have been expected was, at worst, harmless error in allowing an expert conclusion; plaintiff had opened the door on cross by asking on redirect if painful injuries could be sustained without leaving a visible sign.

Shawn Patterson v.   Matt Baker

Seventh Circuit: Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Kristina Box

 

Given circuit precedent on stare decisis,  a GVR citing a specific Supreme Court decision in which no opinion commands the support of a majority of the Court, the analysis of the cited plurality holding looks to the narrowest ground justifying the order.  The controlling rule is either derived from the common ground shared by the rationale of the plurality and the concurrence(s) in the judgment or from a logical subset of non-contradictory reasons that the rationales can accommodate.  The entirety of a single concurrence in the judgment does not control.

The concurrence cited here accords a previous decision stare decisis effect and disagrees with the plurality's distinguishing of the facts, so the narrowest ground is constituted by the balancing test within the prior holding.

Dissent: GVR with a named case implies a common ground in the holding.  Concurrence explicitly warned about imposing a balancing test in the substantial obstacle determination.  Controlling test is the substantial obstacle test from Casey.

Planned Parenthood of Indiana v.  Kristina Box

Seventh Circuit: Zurich American Insurance Com v. Ocwen Financial Corporation

 

At the pleadings stage, insurer did not have the duty to defend, since the natural reading of the specific conduct in the pleadings established that the complained-of conduct violated laws that were within the explicit policy exclusions, and allegations that might encompass conduct outside the exceptions were, under the state's laws, legal labels that were meaningless until defined by the facts at trial.

Zurich American Insurance Com v.  Ocwen Financial Corporation

Seventh Circuit: John Mandacina v. Frederick Entzel

 

The tendency of undisclosed potential impeachment evidence to come into view years afterward isn't a structural flaw in statutory Habeas sufficient to justify an application under the traditional form; the statutory form clock restarts from the discovery of the evidence, and second or successive petitions merely limit the petitioner to a single claim.

Although there is not a one-year limit on the older statutory form of Habeas, in such a case, equitable principles restrict abuse of the Writ.

John Mandacina v.  Frederick Entzel

Seventh Circuit: Jennifer Arguijo v. USCIS

 

Although the private support obligation for stepchildren usually ends with divorce, in public entitlement contexts such as state inheritance tax laws and SSA, the status usually doesn't imply a benefit termination context at divorce.  Since the agency hasn't offered a contrary interpretation, the step-child of the divorced abusive parent has a right to file for naturalization under the Act.

Jennifer Arguijo v. USCIS

Seventh Circuit: Susan Bennett v. Council 31

 

As the employee had expressly agreed to pay the union by authorizing the paycheck deduction, and the contract for representation was valid under the state law of the time, the First Amendment right recognized by the courts after the contract had begun did not require an explicit waiver at the time of contractual formation; even under the new standard, any employee who consents to pay can be bound to the contract.

State law defining a public sector bargaining unit and establishing an exclusive representative organization for the bargaining unit does not violate First Amendment associational rights; plaintiff is not compelled to affiliate with the representative organization, and employees are free to form advocacy groups.

Susan Bennett v. Council 31

Sixth Circuit: Vitalina Lucas Lopez v. Merrick B. Garland

 

Agency did not have to provide alien faced with removal proceedings notice in their native language; a notice in English sufficiently puts the recipient on notice that language assistance will need to be secured.

No authority to review IJ's refusal to sua sponte reopen prior proceeding that resulted in removal order in absentia.

Vitalina Lucas Lopez v. Merrick B. Garland 

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Jason Rosales

 

Sufficient evidence for drug conspiracy, since, despite the fact that drugs were never mentioned between the the two, the structure and manner of the single transaction, combined with the amount of drugs involved, would allow a reasonable finder of fact to convict.  Deft's version of events did not have to be disproven.

Given statutory mandatory minimums, sentencing instructions that looked to the whole conspiracy to establish drug quantities, rather than calculating the amount that each defendant was either responsible for or might reasonably have thought to be involved was harmless error, as there was only a single unit involved in the single transaction.

For the Obstruction of Justice sentencing bump, the court needed to make specific findings of the material hindrance to the investigation caused by deft's throwing the cell phone against the ground; although the sentence ultimately varied downward, remanded for reconsideration.

United States v. Jason Rosales

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Nelson

 

Sufficient grounds for the stop, since, at the border, a consented-to scan of the trailer had revealed it to be largely empty, but a safety seal was evident on the doors; additionally, the stop was within fifty miles of the border.

Being told that he would be free to leave after the canine unit had checked the trailer was insufficiently custodial to exclude the non-mirandized statements in the interval.

Roving stops by Immigration are justified whenever there is reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity.

USA v. Nelson

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Fackrell, et al

 Amended opinion from 3/11 -- slight change to the facts recited on page three.

USA v. Fackrell, et al

Second Circuit: Kinsey v. New York Times Co.

 

Under the state's conflicts rules, since the defamation plaintiff is domiciled in a state other than the district containing the city in which the speech occurred and in which the employment damages were sustained, the state with the strongest interest in the litigation was instead a third forum, the state in which the national newspaper is domiciled, and from which it emanated.

Since the context and structure of the quoted litigation affidavit established that the language was taken from a judicial proceeding, the state's statutory absolute privilege for reports of judicial proceedings applies.

Kinsey v. New York Times Co.