Federal Circuit: Columbus Regional Hospital v. US

 

Disaster support agreement between federal agency and state was an enforceable contract, not a gratuitous provision of resources.

Nonfrivolous assertion of contractual breach by the government sufficed for Claims Court jurisdiction.

Request for assistance and project worksheets did not constitute an express contract; as there was no mutual intent to contract, there was not an implied in fact contract.

As a component of local government, hospital's claim to be a third party beneficiary of a contract between the state and the federal agency is sufficient to state a claim, since the contract named the locality.

As the funds were provided to the hospital contingently, and subject to express conditions, the recoupment of the funds was not an illegal exaction.

Although the requested recovery of funds is equitable it is materially indistinguishable from a claim for reimbursement, and the claim is essentially contractual in nature, giving clear jurisdiction to the Claims Court, an adequate non-APA judicial remedy preferred by statute.

Columbus Regional Hospital v. US

Federal Circuit: In Re: Board of Trustees

 

Claims are patent ineligible mathematical algorithms, basic processes fully disclosed in prior art, and with no real mechanical or computing architecture correlative.

In re: Board of Trustees

Federal Circuit: Santos v. NASA

 

Agency had an obligation to establish by substantial evidence that the employee's performance was subpar both after the notice of potential dismissal and before the notice of potential dismissal.  Upon sufficient showing, the burden would then shift to the employee to establish discriminatory motive.

When the employee asserted that the performance report was due to protected military service commitments, administrative review had an obligation to assess the relevant factors, rather than just saying that the case hadn't been made.

Santos v. NASA

Eleventh Circuit: Michelle Lee Helm v. Greg Carroll, et al

 

In considering whether a reasonable person would have thought that they could have walked away from an allegedly consensual encounter with the police, the race of the suspect is not a relevant factor.  This consideration would be insufficiently universal to be objective, and offends Equal protection.

Concurrence in J:

Ideally, the law would be that the police must affirmatively clarify whether a suspect is free to leave an allegedly consensual but inherently coercive encounter.  Offends Equal Protection.

Michelle Lee Helm v. Greg Carroll, et al

Eleventh Circuit: Charles K. Breland, Jr. v. USA, et al.

 

Bankruptcy court's removal of the debtor-in-possession in favor of a trustee prompted a loss of authority over the estate that constituted sufficient injury for Article III standing to challenge the removal.

Charles K. Breland, Jr. v. USA, et al.

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Hosa Howard

 

In denying the motion for reconsideration made by newly retained counsel, the court merely noted that the pro se petitioner had not advanced any arguments supporting the claim.  Denying the motion to reconsider without considering any of the arguments raised by the parties precludes meaningful appellate review, and constitutes insufficiently reasoned judicial decisionmaking.

United States  v.  Hosa Howard

Eighth Circuit: Lukeus Scott v. Key Energy Services, Inc.

 

Since, after the accident, the device manufacturer was merged into the injured employee's employer, the manufacturer can't presently be considered a third party tortfeasor, even the the person of the employer as successor in interest.

The law of the state disfavors the dual capacity exception to exclusive liability.

Dissent: The state's courts have recognized an exception where there is a distinct, separate legal persona.

Lukeus Scott  v.  Key Energy Services, Inc.

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Jack Chappell

 

Evidence of witness' subsequent admission that she was under the influence of narcotics while testifying that she was not a drug user is not new evidence sufficient to revisit the conviction, since the disclosures do not rise to the level of addressing basic competency to testify, and would at most be in for impeachment.

Government concealment of witness' mental state would not rise to the level of a Brady claim.

No abuse of discretion in refusal to grant downward variance from sentencing guidelines.

Concur in J:

The disclosures about the witness are new evidence, but aren't material.

United States  v.  Jack Chappell

Seventh Circuit: Jesus Ruiz v. USA

 

Statutory Habeas is not available to challenge convictions for which a discrete sentence was imposed when that sentence runs consecutively with multiple terms of life imprisonment that are set to run concurrently and that would not change absent some extraordinary and unexpected change in the law, as the challenged conviction would be harmless error.

Jesus Ruiz v. USA

Seventh Circuit: Kevin Pack v. Middlebury Community Schools

 

The website statement preexisting the nondisparagement agreement that applied to prospective communication, statements, and conduct did not breach the agreement, since the statement was published to the website before the agreement.

Litigation affidavit enjoyed absolute immunity from the nondisparagement terms, since it was relevant and pertinent to the matter before the court.

Statements made to plaintiff's agents posing as prospective employers did not implicate the nondisparagement agreement's limitations on communications with potential employers.

Kevin Pack v. Middlebury Community Schools

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Baltazar-Sebastian

Court's order prohibiting a released detainee's subsequent detention, since it was enforcing an earlier magistrate's holding that the detainee be released, is not within the general immigration removal of jurisdiction.

The bail reform statute does not preclude the pre-removal detention of an alien subsequent to the alien's release under the statute.

Administrative regulations prohibiting a criminal defendant from leaving the country refer to voluntary departures.

The detention does not violate the separation of powers.

Court below did not make formal findings about how the distance that lawyers had to travel related to the Sixth Amendment rights of the deft.

USA v. Baltazar-Sebastian 

Fifth Circuit: Perry v. VHS San Antonio Partners

 

Although the hospital had the authority to order the physicians' group to terminate the services of one of its employees providing services at the hospital, that single fact is insufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact for trial on the question of whether the two enterprises were sufficiently integrated to create liability under the act.

The two entities also, as a matter of law, were not joint employers of the plaintiff, as the hospital did not have the power to hire, the plaintiff set his own schedule, and the two enterprises were not economically integrated.

Plaintiff did not have a contractual relationship with the hospital sufficient for a S1981 claim, and the two entities were sufficiently distinct to establish that he wasn't a contractor of the hospital.

Perry v. VHS San Antonio Partners

Fifth Circuit: Hall CA-NV v. Old Republic

 

Since the parties agreed to remove the provision of the standard form insurance contract relating to the priority of ex ante mechanics liens, the related-back ex ante mechanics liens are not covered by the general provisions of the form contract that protect claim priority generally.

Showing of costs and limited participation in negotiations insufficient to establish loss from dual representation under duty-to-defend.

Hall CA-NV v. Old Republic

Fifth Circuit: Sierra Club v. DOI

 

Species mortality limit was not arbitrary and capricious, since the additional discussions mentioned in the agreement are superfluous to the hard take limits.

Agency's determination of the several effects of other projects and the cumulative effects of all projects in the designated region was not arbitrary and capricious.

Sierra Club v. DOI

Fourth Circuit: Vernon Earle v. Shreves

 

Bivvens remedy not available for a prisoner's grievance retaliation claim under the First Amendment.

Vernon Earle v. Shreves

Fourth Circuit: Phillip Alig v. Quicken Loans Inc.

The class claim is sufficiently predominant, since all of the customers--even those who benefited--paid the fee; determining individual statute of limitations issues would be merely ministerial; defendant's general concealment underlay each instance of fraudulent inducement; appraisal variance would be merely ministerial; and the statutory damages are uniform.

Although the agreement's reference to a timely appraisal was insufficient guarantee to create a contract, the taking of a security deposit for the purposes of verifying identity and credit formed a binding contract.

Under the state's law, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is relevant only to the analysis of actual breach of contract.

Concealment of potential improper contact with appraisers was sufficiently proximate to the formation of the agreement with the homeowners to qualify as unconscionable inducement under the state's statute.

Dissent:

Practice was customary in the industry; no actual inducement; communications with the appraiser did not breach the agreement to provide an appraisal.

Phillip Alig v. Quicken Loans Inc.

Second Circuit: Reynolds v. Quiros, et al.

 

Actual conditions of prisoner's solitary confinement present a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

State statute imposing conditions for the incarceration of prisoners whose death sentences have been commuted, passed after the legislative elimination of the death penalty and prior to the judicial determination that those already sentenced to death should have their sentences commuted, was an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder, imposing specific punishments on implicitly designated specific persons without the benefit of trial.

Classification of prisoner as a higher security threat than others similarly situated had no rational basis, and violated Equal Protection.

Concurrence:

Eighth Amendment claims of mistreatment of prisoners require an element of subjective intent.

Reynolds v. Quiros, et al.

Second Circuit: Cho et al. v. BlackBerry Ltd. et al.

 

Since the named members of a putative class didn't individually join the appeal, they can't participate in any action subsequent to the disposition of the appeal; they were not included in their capacity as others similarly situated, although they might have been included if the appeal had been filed by a putative representative et al.

Since the defendant added subsequent to the appeal was in privity with the original defendants and the cause of action arose from the same transaction or occurrence, res judicata prevents the named non-appellants from pursuing their claims against the new party.

Court did not abuse discretion in denying the motion to reconsider.

Cho et al. v. BlackBerry Ltd. et al.

Second Circuit: James Domen v. Vimeo, Inc.

 

Since the video streaming service's removal of the Plaintiff's account was a good faith effort to enforce an internal policy that was aimed at removing objectionable content, the federal statutory safe-harbor applies, preempting state antidiscrimination laws and state public forum content-neutrality laws.

James Domen v. Vimeo, Inc

Second Circuit: Tingling v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.

 

Docketing of hand-written documentation of pretrial conference report and stipulations prior to its being typed up meant that revisions other than the typing would require the modification of the order into which the report and stipulations were incorporated.

Plaintiff did not make sufficient showing of undue hardship to justify discharge of the statutorily protected debt. 

Tingling v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.