Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Court erred in assigning the term the meaning it served in the description of the function of the device within an unclaimed surrounding mechanism.
The doctrine of equivalents is not a binary question of vitiation, but a reasoned inquiry that looks to the degree that the second device performs the same function, in the same way, and achieves the same result.
Again, perhaps. Not really at all Patent-savvy in this quarter.
Although the claim sounds in contract, the requested relief requires reversal of agency determinations under the APA; the proper forum is therefore District Court, not the Court of Federal Claims.
Judicial review of a decision on estoppel during the institution and pendency of an IPR is appropriate, because the estoppel statute applies to the duration of the action, not just the decision to institute proceedings.
Board correctly did not estop the party's claim, since there was no evidence of actual control and direction between the interested party and the litigating party, and the pre-existing relationship was not one that suggested coordinated action.
Given the plain language of the statute, the claim that the interested party was not estopped from raising was fair, as that specific claim had not arisen in the earlier action.
Substantial evidence for Board's obviousness and disclosure determinations.
(Perhaps. We don't know many things, but we especially don't know Patents. As always, entertainment value only.)
Administrative remedy for unfavorable employment action must consider the penalty imposed, not because it has the power to mitigate it, but because it forms part of the substance of the decision.
Error for the agency to remove an employee under the non-retroactive statute for conduct occurring before the statute became law.
As the FOIA requestor's intention was to write a book published by an academic press, it was an abuse of discretion to hold that the motive for the request was commercial in nature.
Even if no circuit precedent clearly defined the right, applying a taser to a teenager having a seizure while being held down by several police officers falls within the "obvious clarity" exception; the denial of qualified immunity was therefore appropriate.
The lack of intervention from the officer's supervisors derivatively falls within the same exception.
Even if the officer had arguable probable cause for detaining the teenager having a seizure, the manner of detention also enters into the S1983 calculus.
By considering the information provided and holding a hearing on the matter, the immigration judge took care in determining the competency of the pro se alien defendant sufficient to assure fundamental rights of Due Process; although the alien reported that the voices that he was hearing in his head disturbed his thought processes, his demeanor appeared sufficiently lucid and responsive.
Right to counsel claim under the Rehabilitation Act required administrative exhaustion.
For immigration law purposes, recklessly threatening substantial property damage with actual intent to interrupt public access to a portion of the building is a crime of moral turpitude. The specific intent of the state statute is a sufficiently aggravating factor under circuit precedent.
Although subjective ability to dissociate and reflect is relevant to determining whether two acts are divisible, a three day gap sufficed to establish the division as a matter of law.
Chevron deference to agency on the question of whether the agency should consider the insanity element of the criminal plea, as a prior apparently contradictory agency interpretation spoke to the evidentiary bounds of the agency's consideration, and the cited opinion addressed the appropriate substantive grounds for the agency's consideration.
Concur/dissent:
Agency shoudl have considered mental health element of plea in relevant conviction; arbitrary application of precedent dejustifies deference.
Vacatur with instructions from the Supreme Court of the US presents a jurisdictional limit to the review on remand.
Unambiguously, the sentencing reform statute applied only to those sentences imposed after its effective date; cases pending on direct or collateral review where the sentence had already been imposed were not affected by the statute.
Even if made in a good faith belief in the validity of the claim, lawsuits and communications made to collect time-barred debts (and that do not acknowledge the lapsed time limit) are both unfair and misleading, and incur strict liability under the federal debt collection law. A mistake about the state law statute of limitations underlying the claim is a mistake of fact that might qualify as an exculpatory bona fide error under the federal law.
Where the meaning of the state statute is plain, categorical review of state criminal statute for purpose of immigration law does not require that the petitioner establish that there is a reasonable probability of prosecution for conduct falling within the state statute but not within the scope of its federal analogue.
The statute regulating time from indictment to trial cannot be tolled for general court congestion, even when the Judicial Conference has declared an emergency in that district. Remand to decide whether dismissal is with prejudice.
Anxiety is insufficient prejudice upon which to base a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim.
Concurrence: Delay was due to counsel's last minute disclosures, not general congestion.
As there was no contemporaneous objection to the exclusion from statutory calculations, review should be for plain error.
(Not labelled a concurrence in judgment, but begins by explicitly agreeing with the relief and then setting forth different reasoning.)
Actionable refusal of settlement was within the terms of the policy as an act deemed wrongful by timely reporting, despite an earlier holding of the court that the act was ultimately not wrongful as defined by a separate exclusion within the policy.
As a claim is an assertion of an existing right, demands for damages and indemnification prior to the change in the law that created the right of recovery against the plaintiff were not considered claims under the policy.
Rise in tolls ultimately directed to state treasury rather than maintenance does not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce, because the state is acting as a marketplace participant; at the time of the Founding, roads were largely private, and the state has a right to its revenues.
Disproportionate effect on interstate commerce was not established, and is irrelevant to the state's actions as market participant.
Given the proximity of the guns to the drugs in the deft's domain, sufficient evidence to establish a sentencing bump by a preponderance, despite acquittal on the drug trafficking charge.
Although the denial of compassionate release during the pandemic looked to commentary in the guidelines that applies only to motions by the government, it also individually considered the other appropriate factors, and the denial can be upheld on those grounds.
The modification to the Habeas statute requiring that the application be filed with the sentencing court is jurisdictional limit on the original statute.
Given the savings clause, the federal statute doesn't create field preemption.
Although employees can seek relief under state or federal statutes, the federal statute preempts any state tort claims within its scope.
Bivvens not extended to cover a federal agent's preventing the plaintiff from leaving a parking lot and then using excessive force to effect an unlawful seizure.
Court's order requiring an in-person appearance at arraignment is not subject to interlocutory review under the criminal collateral order rule.
Court's requirement that the deft secure housing within the district of the court was a reasonable amendment to the release conditions, given the deft's reluctance to travel during a time of pandemic disease. Due Process did not require a hearing, or a finding of a violation of the prior conditions.
Concur/dissent: a requirement to secure new housing four days before an arraignment with presumptive incarceration isn't ripe for review, as a subsequent release condition wouldn't be a modification but a new finding.
Dicta: Court did not sufficiently take into account administrative determination that in-person hearings presented a danger.
Federal officer removal was appropriate, because at the time of removal, there was a colorable claim that the government was specific and complete, the contractor could not deviate from it, and it was implemented under the direct supervision of the government, and the government had more comprehensive knowledge of the risk at issue than did the contractor.
Challenges to discovery orders must identify the crucial evidence that would otherwise have been obtained.
As the expert testimony claiming exposure to the substance prior to the enactment of the statutory exclusive remedy was derived from factual assumptions rather than actual evidence, the statute provides the sole remedy.
Communication with an employee of a represented corporate party whose statements might be imputed to the corporate party wasn't an abuse of discretion, but as fee-shifting isn't in the state's rules, imposing a monetary sanction would require a finding of either bad faith or willful disobedience of a court's order.
Clear error to exclude evidence in preliminary injunction hearing as hearsay following finding that the situation lacked sufficient urgency to justify admitting hearsay; in a preliminary injunction hearing, the hearsay nature of the evidence always goes to the weight of the evidence.
Clear error to exclude a category of evidence in a preliminary injunction hearing after determining that two documents of the type were unreliable, and another after being unable to determine the reliability of that type of evidence (latter harmless error). Everything in for appropriate weight.
For purposes of the obstruction statutes, a minor delay is not per se a reasonable obstruction; the court must still determine if the delay was a reasonable one.
Placement of signs on a sidewalk in a manner that does not functionally exclude access can still be an attempt to intimidate or obstruct within the terms of the statute, even if no pedestrians appear.
When a protester's actions necessitate that an escort step in front of the protected person, the protester has caused the physical obstruction defined in the statute.
Regardless of the consensual nature of the conversation, speaking to someone inside a vehicle through an open door or placing hands on the car while speaking impeded the car from driving away, and could be considered obstruction.
When taken in the context of recent local violence, and given the subjective fear that the listeners felt, stating that death might come at any time would objectively be taken as a true threat not protected by the First Amendment; similar statements conjoined with an exhortation to repent, or referencing disasters distinct from recent local violence present a different question.
As the decision to have an abortion involves a formidable and poignant process, protesters' seeking to force their ideals on patients approaching a facility creates an inference of intent to harass, annoy or alarm. An explicit or implicit request to be left alone dispels the legitimate intent of potential interlocutors.
Likely repetition of the violations of the statutes suffices to establish irreparable harm for the injunction.
In the interests of judicial economy, cross-appeal of non-movants' early motions not referenced in the memorandum denying the preliminary injunction are appropriately addressed in the appeal of the denial of the injunction under pendent jurisdiction.
Abortion facility speech limitations are content neutral, as they apply to every abortion facility in any context.
Statutes not void for vagueness, given general definitions in criminal code.
Municipal statute creating a cause of action for "any person" legitimizes a parens patriae action by the state in which the municipality is located; sufficient quasi-sovereign interest demonstrated here.
Concurrence:
Municipal statute is a state statute, since the municipality is a creation of the state; certifying the question to the state would be necessary to determine if the state could act parens patriae by its own statute.
Concur/Dissent:
General dissent as to not honoring the determinations of the finder of fact.
Since the cause of action doesn't list government bodies and the rest of the code generally does, and the statute designates a specific enforcement entity with power to seek an injunction, the state does not have parens patriae standing.
Courts are permitted to consider hearsay in a preliminary injunction hearing; they are not required to do so.
Statute's restriction on making access unreasonably difficult or dangerous explicitly excludes de minimis interference. Concluding otherwise impermissibly burdens speech.
Finder of fact held that a reasonable observer familiar with the speaker's preaching would not have interpreted the statements about impending death as true threats.
Irreparable harm finding requires ongoing plans and activities.