Although the district has recently clarified that the special motion to dismiss statute imposes a burden equivalent to summary judgment in the federal courts, the statute can't be applied in federal court, because the movant under the statute has no burden to make any showing on the merits and the statute limits the discovery process.
Nothing in the denials by the targets of the investigative reporting constituted readily verifiable evidence needed to support a plausible case that the publisher had a degree of awareness of probable falsity sufficient to establish reckless disregard for the truth.
DISSENT:
Even absent contradictory evidence, a story might be inherently implausible, and a publisher has an affirmative duty to reasonably dispel their own doubts. First consider the inherent plausibility, then consider counterarguments.
The concession that there was no evidence that the counterparty to the transaction alleged to be the motive for the bribery knew of the payments, and the lack of motive for self-dealing bribery in the bonuses awarded make the story sufficiently inherently improbable.
The facts cited in the denials were sufficient to cast doubt on the story.
Circuit split suggested.
NYT v. Sullivan should be overruled.