Federal Circuit: Maybourn Group, LTD v. ITC


Sufficient standing to challenge agency determination where company continues to import goods possibly subject to exclusion order and has lost actual sales sue to the uncertainty over their legal status.

Discovery of prior art that would negate the patent that serves as the basis for the exclusion order is not sufficient basis for a petition against the exclusion order, as the agency's statutory powers of patent adjudication are limited to claims made by parties in formal enforcement actions.



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Eleventh Circuit: Myra Corley, et al v. Long-Lewis, Inc., et al


As governing circuit precedent on the question is in conflict with earlier circuit precedent that it doesn't distinguish or overrule, the earlier precedent governs -- voluntary dismissal without prejudice is therefore a sufficiently final order for the purposes of appeal, since it removed the case from the court's consideration.

Interlocutory denial of motion to reconsider by the courts of another circuit that eventuates in a voluntary dismissal with prejudice within the circuit is considered only in the context of the appeal from the voluntary dismissal; the implied challenge to the other circuit's courts does not make the subsequent decisions within the circuit unreviewable.

Appellant is sufficiently adverse for purposes of standing to final decision below.  Although it resulted from appellant's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, the decision contained merged elements of earlier adverse interlocutory decisions.

No abuse of discretion in denying motion to shift governing law to Admiralty when made in motion to reconsider.

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Eighth Circuit: United States v. Jeffrey Rodd


Since the District Court conceded that deft met the requirements for compassionate release, the only inquiry for review is whether there is sufficient indication in the record that the possibility of release was weighed against the sentencing court's justification for the sentence.

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Eighth Circuit: United States v. Shari Natysin


Company's software allowed deft sufficient discretion to justify sentencing bump for abusing a position of private trust, as she could structure the finances singlehandedly.

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Eighth Circuit: United States v. Mark Ringland


Private searches by email provider subsequent to first report to authorities did not transform the provider into a government agent for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment; Carpenter scope not implicated by email provider's capacity for private search.

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Seventh Circuit: USA v. Aga Khan


No plain error in refusing acceptance of responsibility sentence mitigation, since deft only stipulated to the facts, rather than personally conceding the scope of the fraud, and the grand jury testimony transcripts that were the basis for the court's finding on the scope of fraud were provided to all parties, who could timely object.

Plain error in procedural sentencing error resulting on one of the concurrent terms of supervised relief being in excess of the statute, since a revocation proceeding would address all terms of supervised release.

Absent showing that victim bank intended to hold collateral real estate s investment, no error in not offsetting the restitution by the value of the unliquidated collateral; no obligation on the victim bank to notify parties of subsequent sale of the collateral.

Sentencing court's allocation of restitution to a certain percentage of deft's future income sufficiently considered deft's financial circumstances, as under the statute no such consideration is due when determining the total amount.
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Seventh Circuit: Adam Delgado v. U.S. Department of Justice


ALJ inappropriately reopened matters resolved by Article III law of the case.
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Seventh Circuit: Scott McCray v. Robert Wilkie


Employer's refusal to replace vehicle in a timely manner states a claim under the Rehabilitation Act.

Claim originating in assignment of offices not pellucid enough, will be developed on remand.

Conduct potentially violating Title VII raised in employer's motion to dismiss insulated employer from Title VII claim when plaintiff didn't make the argument in the reply brief.

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Sixth Circuit: Kevin Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc


Pleading that alleged tortfeasor conducted business, formed contracts, and caused injury within the state suffices to state a claim involving sufficient purposeful availment for personal jurisdiction within the forum; further discovery is warranted where such a claim is made against a supplier who sells their product through a national retail chain.

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Sixth Circuit: Joan Weser v. Kimberly Goodson



Presence on property sufficient for criminal trespass arrest for the purposes of S1983 claim, as officer's witness of the midemeanor as required by state law isn't a requirement under the Federal Constitution.

Even deliberate mistruth would not be enough to implicate private citizen in S1983 false arrest claim, as it's not under the color of state law.

District Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over false arrest state tort claim, as arrest with probable cause for an offense not justifying custodial arrest is a novel issue for the tort.

False statements by private individual not a sufficient basis for state tort claim of false arrest, as insufficient nexus to the arrest.


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Fifth Circuit: Houston Aquarium, Incorporated v. OSHC, et al



ALJ correctly accepted analysis on matters other than the ultimate issue from lay witness, as lay witnesses can draw conclusions based on their experience; deft's witnesses appropriately considered lay witnesses, as there was no foundation laid.

Feeding and cleaning dives at an aquarium are scientific, not commercial, given plain meaning and the notes to the regulation, since they gather data and don't involve heavy tools.  Also the protections for commercial divers seem unnecessary in this context.

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Fifth Circuit: USA v. Louis Luyten


No clear error in sentencing bump for conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily injury, as deft. transported aliens in a small plane, one over the rated capacity, and had no pilot's license.


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Fifth Circuit: USA v. Robert Montgomery


Plain error in offender registration conviction, as, under categorical analysis, the predicate conviction was for a crime that has a reasonable probability of sweeping more broadly than the Federal standard.

Concur: Categorical analysis is generally a muddle.


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Fourth Circuit: US v. Billy Curry, Jr.


Suspicionless stop and search of person in proximity to audible gunshots was not justified under the emergency aid exception within exigent circumstances, as such a stop would require firm knowledge of the crime and a close geographical association with the place of the crime.

CJ, concur:  Dissent's approach risks overpolicing, country at a moment of reckoning.

Concur: Sociology and predictive policing not a basis for law.

Concur: Scotus dictum sets standard for special needs exigency, searches must be discretionless and systematic.

Concur: Predictive policing = racial profiling.

Dissent 1: Having to stop and wait to get the details of the crime undercuts predictive policing, results in communities under-served by police.

 Dissent 2: Upon reasonable suspicion of exigency, police must balance the gravity of the risk against the right infringed.

(Amended opinion presumably corrects typo from "waiving Constitutions in the air" to "waving Constitutions in the air,  per Google archive of old file.) 
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Second Circuit: United States v. Jones


Pace the Ninth Circuit, the relevant statute's proscription of "false and fictitious" documents includes false versions of legitimate documents, not just novel types of instruments.

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Second Circuit: Jack v. Barr



Conviction under state statute encompassing loaded antique firearms is not a categorical predicate for Immigration removal under federal statutory definition adopted by the agency, as that definition excludes antique firearms.

Considering the question de novo, agency erred in requiring petitioner to establish a reasonable probability that the state would prosecute conduct outside the federal and agency standard, as there is no ambiguity in the statute.

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