End of day

Still hoping to move to full coverage, while balancing dissertation & slings/arrows/what have you.

More from today:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/07/16-55090.pdf

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/07/15-50366.pdf

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/07/15-35834.pdf

http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/17-1845.Opinion.9-7-2018.pdf

-CB

Ninth Circuit: Rynearson v. Fergusun

(Rakoff (SDNY) on panel.)

When a person subject to a protective judicial order seeks to challenge the constitutionality of one of the statutes implicated by the order, federal courts are not required to abstain from the question, as the interference with the state criminal proceeding would be indirect and not dispositive.

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/07/17-35853.pdf


Eighth Circuit: William Hatcher v. MDOW Insurance Company

Insurance policy renewed at discretion of policyholder and insurer can be modified during the course of the policy with sufficient notice; continued premiums serve as considerations for any changes.  Boilerplate letters instructing policyholder to review the terms of the policy prior to renewal constitute sufficient notice.

No prejudice from improperly sustained objection to testimony, as the objection was at sidebar, the jury was not informed, and there was no proffer as to what might have been revealed in that line of testimony.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/09/172410P.pdf

Eighth Circuit: Charter Advanced Services v. Nancy Lange

Voice-IP system is properly considered an information service, as the data is transformed to the traditional telephony format before entering the network.  State regulation therefore preempted by the field of federal law.

Dissent: There is no noticeable transformation between end users, some networks use voice-IP internally, transforming to traditional format before routing to user.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/09/172290P.pdf

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Desmond Cam

For the purposes of the advisory sentencing guidelines, Hobbs Act robbery is not a predicate crime of violence, either as robbery or through its use of force, since it encompasses conduct limited to the threatened harm to property.

http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0201p-06.pdf


Sixth Circuit: John Doe v. David Baum

Where the facts are in dispute and there are competing narratives of events, due process requires that public universities allow either the accused student of his or her representative directly to question the accuser.

A judicial proceeding in which everyone of one gender is believed and all those of the other gender are disbelieved states a claim under Title IX.

Concurrence -- Title IX violation states a claim; some grounds for the claim improperly excluded by this holding, as they're more appropriate to the summary judgment standard.

Dissent -- Due Process right to confront the witness can be vindicated by written questions.  Insufficient particularized causal connection for Title IX claims.

http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0200p-06.pdf

Fifth Circuit: Michael Vaughn, ex rel., et al v. United Biologics

A relator under the Act can seek voluntary dismissal with prejudice for purely private interests without binding the non-intervening government side, whose interests in the claim are dismissed without prejudice.

Statute requiring written opinion and reason for decision presents two freestanding requirements which can be accomplished separately.

Relators' having shared counsel with second relator in another forum who intends to pursue the action does not establish bad faith.

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-20389-CV0.pdf

Third Circuit: USA v. Amy Gonzalez

Sufficient evidence for conspiracy conviction where the deft claims a genuine belief in the inciting statements, but finder of fact holds them to be objectively false.

Specific unanimity instruction not required, as the different mental states enumerated are alternate means of accomplishing the crime, not distinct potential elements of the crime.  Where a statute lists several acts, commission of any two of which would be an element of the crime, specific unanimity as to the underlying acts is not required, as the point of the list is to identify conduct that violates the actual prohibition.

For the statutory finding that death had resulted from the crime, the finder of fact must find it to be a forseeable proximate cause; there is no need to establish that the defts actually intended to cause death, and culpability can be established by the liability of a co-conspirator.

As the cyberstalking was defamatory and part of the commission of the crime, the law as applied in this case does not violate the First Amendment.

A recusal order that might reasonably be read to transfer venue but is then amended to clarify that it only recuses the present judge does not impugn the present venue.

Possibly prejudicial prior family court records properly admitted with limiting instructions.

Statements to a therapist as part of the therapy are admissible under the hearsay exeption for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment, in addition to being evidence of the state of mind.

Hearsay emails to third parties properly admitted, as they spoke to how the acts referenced affected the writer's state of mind.

,Statements to therapist insufficiently testimonial to trigger the Confrontation Clause.

Question on cross as to whether the law enforcement officer had doubts about the defts' guilt opened the door for a vouching statement on redirect.  Vouching appropriately limited by instruction.

Court did not err in holding that testimony as to deft's honesty, peacefulness, and law abiding behaviour opened the door to testimony as to specific acts related to the present prosecution.

Factual findings by the judge during sentencing increased the advisory range, and not the statutory maximum -- these findings therefore could be made by a preponderance. and without reference to the jury's findings.

Deft's presence in courthouse should have put him on notice that it was foreseeable that a law enforcement officer might be injured in the coming imbroglio.

Injury to victim's children justified the increase of sentence for harming a vulnerable victim.

Life sentence for cyberstalking conspiracy resulting in death does not offend the Eighth Amendment.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/161540p.pdf