Prior panel decision partially affirming grounds of an earlier decision vacated by Supreme Court binds the present panel, and circuit precedent holds that under modified categorical review, the state statute is a valid predicate crime of violence. As the charging documents alleged attempt, the only provision of the statute that criminalizes attempt was the provision under which the deft was convicted.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/07/171320P.pdf
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Eighth Circuit: Scott H. Lansing v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
As the claim based in a loan modification application arose within the pendency of the initial foreclosure action, it was available then as an affirmative defense, and is therefore now barred by res judicata. The present claim based on the loan application violated petitioner's contractual agreement not to judicially challenge the foreclosure action.
Eighth Circuit: Ken Ross, Jr. v. Special Administrative Board
Third party intervenors have Article III standing in an action centered on a consent decree where the intervenor claims that a likely improper enforcement of the consent decree will have adverse consequences for the funding of the schools that their children attend.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/07/163437P.pdf
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/07/163437P.pdf
Seventh Circuit: Alvaro Cortina-Chavez v. Jefferson B. Sessions III
Denial of request for sua sponte administrative review is unreviewable.
No abuse of discretion in denying motion to reconsider on the grounds that the petitioner neither alerted the agency to the specific basis for the appeal nor filed a brief within the required schedule, as both grounds operate as independent bases for the decision, and petitioner only appealed the first.
No abuse of discretion in referral to a single judge rather than a panel, since regulations specifically empower a single judge to dismiss on the grounds stated by the agency.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D07-05/C:17-2116:J:Rovner:aut:T:fnOp:N:2182163:S:0
No abuse of discretion in denying motion to reconsider on the grounds that the petitioner neither alerted the agency to the specific basis for the appeal nor filed a brief within the required schedule, as both grounds operate as independent bases for the decision, and petitioner only appealed the first.
No abuse of discretion in referral to a single judge rather than a panel, since regulations specifically empower a single judge to dismiss on the grounds stated by the agency.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D07-05/C:17-2116:J:Rovner:aut:T:fnOp:N:2182163:S:0
Sixth Circuit: In re Chenault
Fact of sentence to parole doesn't state a claim of sufficient hardship for student loan debt discharge in bankruptcy.
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18b0010p-06.pdf
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18b0010p-06.pdf
Sixth Circuit: United States v. Daniel Sexton
Sentencing bump for commission of crime while under sentence was appropriate by the terms of the guidelines, since deft was on summary probation in contemplation of dismissal following a nolo contendere plea.
Leadership sentencing increase appropriate where deft own corporations engaged in the activity and employs admins; existence of other leaders is immaterial.
Within guidelines sentence substantively reasonable.
Forfeiture appropriate to any assets obtained through the crime; there is no need for the deft to have actually received the assets. Tension with S.Ct.U.S. holding on a parallel statute, circuit split flagged.
No plain error in court's acceptance of charge-off methodology and costs in the PSR.
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0132p-06.pdf
Leadership sentencing increase appropriate where deft own corporations engaged in the activity and employs admins; existence of other leaders is immaterial.
Within guidelines sentence substantively reasonable.
Forfeiture appropriate to any assets obtained through the crime; there is no need for the deft to have actually received the assets. Tension with S.Ct.U.S. holding on a parallel statute, circuit split flagged.
No plain error in court's acceptance of charge-off methodology and costs in the PSR.
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0132p-06.pdf
Sixth Circuit: Jodi Hohman v. Maurice Eadie
By the terms of the statute, taxpayers have a cause of action for improper collection activities, but not for improper assessment activities.
Although the natural persons and small partnerships holding a cause of action under the statute resemble LLCs, LLCs are not within the plain terms of the statute, and do not have a right to file suit.
Discovery properly limited.
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0131p-06.pdf
Although the natural persons and small partnerships holding a cause of action under the statute resemble LLCs, LLCs are not within the plain terms of the statute, and do not have a right to file suit.
Discovery properly limited.
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0131p-06.pdf
Third Circuit: Clientron Corp v. Devon IT Inc
As there was no showing that the misconduct benefited the defendants personally, District Court was correct in not piercing the corporate veil on a theory of sham, as corporate formalities should be considered differently with respect to closely held or family corporations.
As the discovery sanction against one spouse, holding that a corporation held by a tenancy by the entirety was in fact an alter ego, created a split between federal substantive law for the discovery sanction and state substantive law for the co-tenant by the entirety, it was an abuse of discretion. Under state law, both who hold by a tenancy of the entirety are presumed to act for the benefit of the marriage.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/163432p.pdf
As the discovery sanction against one spouse, holding that a corporation held by a tenancy by the entirety was in fact an alter ego, created a split between federal substantive law for the discovery sanction and state substantive law for the co-tenant by the entirety, it was an abuse of discretion. Under state law, both who hold by a tenancy of the entirety are presumed to act for the benefit of the marriage.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/163432p.pdf
Third Circuit: Ahmed Bakran v. Secretary
As the statute vests the determination of status in the agency and such action is statutorily unreviewable, supporting criteria developed by the agency are also unreviewable, as they are merely interpretive aspects of the determination.
As the felony conviction of the alien's spouse and sponsor does not impede the marriage, but merely the right of the spouse to live in the US, the right to marry is not affected; further, the question of residency is much broader, and the limitation of the rights of the sponsor following a felony conviction is a reasonable one.
As the statute that attached new limitations to the rights of those already convicted was clearly intended to apply to past convictions and referenced post-enactment dangers, there is no violation of Ex Post Facto; waived anyway.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/163440p.pdf
As the felony conviction of the alien's spouse and sponsor does not impede the marriage, but merely the right of the spouse to live in the US, the right to marry is not affected; further, the question of residency is much broader, and the limitation of the rights of the sponsor following a felony conviction is a reasonable one.
As the statute that attached new limitations to the rights of those already convicted was clearly intended to apply to past convictions and referenced post-enactment dangers, there is no violation of Ex Post Facto; waived anyway.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/163440p.pdf
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