Federal Circuit: Royal Crown Company, Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Company, Inc.

A mark is generic if the public would understand that it referred to a key aspect of the genus, leading it to believe the mark is a generic term.  This can be established from any competent source.

The inquiry into distinctiveness becomes more stringent as the mark grows more specific.

Association of the mark with the genus is not necessarily proof of the generic nature of the mark.

http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/16-2375.Opinion.6-20-2018.pdf

Ninth Circuit: Nu Image v. IATSE Local 720

The relevant statute only grants federal jurisdiction over claims of CBA violations; a suit alleging that the provision is void for lack of formation under state law therefore does not state a claim under the statute.

Dissent: It can be construed as a request for declaratory judgment as to the plaintiffs own alleged violation of that provision of the CBA.

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/20/16-55451.pdf

Ninth Circuit: Robert Stephens v. CoreLogic, Inc.

To establish contributory infringement under the statute, plaintiff needs to establish a likelihood of specific future infringement; specific allegations of the theory of infringement are necessary.  While the software removes the metadata that aids in the detection of infringement, plaintiffs do not demonstrate how removal of this information alone will prompt a future infringement.

Discovery denials appropriate, as there was no specific statement of how the additional time and productions would show such future specific infringement.

Costs for testimony of employees of deft corporation can be taxed to opposing party.

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/20/16-56089.pdf

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Nicholas Ryan Hemsher

Inconsistencies in self-interested witnesses' testimony were subject to cross, and do not establish lack of sufficient evidence.

Exclusion of prior inconsistent statement to police was harmless, as inconsistencies explored elsewhere, and no contemporaneous proffer; exclusion of exited utterances by police during search was proper, since police officers don't get excited--also harmless.

Sufficient evidence for sentence enhancement based on number of firearms.  Enhancement for another felony found by a preponderance can apply to firearm trafficking and possession, so long as it's not the actual underlying crime charged.  Texts from incarceration referencing "snitches" sufficed for obstruction enhancement.  Disparities in co-conspirators' sentences not per se unreasonable.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/172189P.pdf

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Thomas Grace

A sentencing judge may properly consider offenses already incorporated in the guidelines calculations when deciding to vary upwards where the prior offenses strongly parallel the present crime.  Argument that elements of state statute raised in sentencing were not met in present crime was waived since it was first raised in reply brief.  Consideration of the statute not per se unreasonable.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/171572P.pdf

Seventh Circuit: Henry Fiorentini v. Paul Revere Life Insurance

As a claimant has the burden to establish a covered condition, a CEO who has returned to work and exercises control over the corporation cannot establish a claim for disability based on the inability to perform another management task (sales) that he deems essential for the corporation to succeed.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-21/C:17-3137:J:Barrett:aut:T:fnOp:N:2174099:S:0

Seventh Circuit: USA v. Donald S. Harden

Sufficient evidence to establish death from the drugs sold where timeline suggests proximate consumption, despite statements in the record to the contrary regarding the substance's toxicity.

Sentencing enhancement for death requires merely actual causation, not proof of proximate cause; conspiracy provision does not imply reasonable forseeability.

Court's exclusion of testimony about another source for drugs was harmless error and not an abuse of discretion, as it might have tended to confuse.

Giving a timestamped convenience store surveillance photograph of the deft to the jury during deliberations did not warrant a mistrial.

Prosecution statements in closing and rebuttal closing (saying that the deft knew the present batch of heroin to be fatal, as opposed to the previous batch; saying that deft furnished drugs on both days as opposed to just one) don't warrant reversal, sufficiently cured ("if what the lawyers said is different than the evidence that you remember, the evidence is what counts.")

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-1270:J:Flaum:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173545:S:0

Seventh Circuit: Pain Center of SE Indiana, LLC v. Origin Healthcare Solutions LLC

Anonymous parties to case are sufficiently de minimis for diversity purposes, so there's jurisdiction.

Actively supported software license is, under state "predominant thrust" test, a contract for services, rather than goods, making the UCC inapplicable.

State tort claims are time-barred, as the plaintiff had knowledge of the harm during the continuing contract.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-1276:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173943:S:0

Seventh Circuit: Comsys Incorporated v. Frank Pacetti

While the restrictions on freedom of speech while in the employ of the government apply to contracted corporations and their employees, where the line between protected and unprotected speech is ambiguous, qualified immunity protects the government from claims of unlawful retaliation.

As the Fourth Amendment only protects against invasion by public actors, accessing of email records by employee of contracted corporation did not violate; the question of direction by state actors is ambiguous enough to warrant qualified immunity.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-2053:J:Easterbrook:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173897:S:0

Seventh Circuit: Anthony Simpkins v. DuPage Housing Authority

In considering whether a worker is an employee for the purposes of the FSLA, questions of fact are reviewed for clear error, while questions of law are reviewed de novo; at summary judgment, though, since the court makes no findings of fact, the question of genuine issue of material fact is reviewed de novo.

Here, sufficient question for trial.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-2685:J:Bauer:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173923:S:0

Seventh Circuit: US v. Larry Norton

Where conflicting testimony at trial suggests that deft was zero to five mph over the speed limit, no clear error in holding that traffic stop at prompting of drug task force didn't violate the Fourth Amendment.

Admission of informant's statements on recording, if hearsay, was harmless error, as they merely provided useful context for others statements.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-2898:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173776:S:0

Sixth Circuit: Randy Pearce v. Chrysler Grp. LLC Pension Plan

Error for District Court to simultaneously bar challenges raised before the magistrate and hold all challenges not raised before the magistrate to be waived.

Employer had a duty to list the firing exception in the summary of plan benefits; this exclusion justifies reformation of the plan, which should be considered by the court sitting in equity as being similar to the fraud element of equitable estoppel.

As Plan provisions enabled the individual to accurately calculate benefits, standalone claim of equitable estoppel is not available.

http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0114p-06.pdf

Fourth Circuit: Ohio Valley Environmental v. Scott Pruitt

Plaintiffs have sufficient Article III standing to challenge EPA action affecting a state's rivers when they can establish concrete and particular harms arising from some subset of the rivers.

State's lack of filing is insufficiently clear and ambiguous to trigger the constructive submission of a refusal to file -- the question of agency obligation is therefore one for trial.

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171430.P.pdf

Fourth Circuit: Alan Metzgar v. KBR, Inc.

Suit against military contractor for trash burn pits and water provision is barred under the political question doctrine, given that the military's control over the processes at issue was plenary and actual.

As the suit is dismissed as nonjusticiable, the pendent FTCA suit is moot -- statutory exemption not reached.

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171960.P.pdf

Fourth Circuit: US v. Edward Kehoe

One anonymous tip and one named tip sufficed for the search of the deft, given that the location was known to be the type of bar where people might drink with concealed weapons.

Court's instruction to counsel to consider why a caucasian person might have brought a gun to a predominantly african-american bar was egregious, but it didn't taint the proceeding, as the tips could still be weighed, and argument wasn't impeded.

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/174536.P.pdf

Third Circuit: Gerald Carroll v. E One Inc

Award of fees to deft upon dismissal with prejudice following plaintiffs' mistaken motion to unilaterally dismiss a suit that had advanced past discovery and answer was not an abuse of discretion; plaintiff's lack of investigation, combined with their practices in other districts presented a sufficiently extraordinary circumstance to justify the grant.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/172183p.pdf

Second Circuit: Simon v. City of New York

Denial of qualified immunity for custodial arrest and interrogation over the course of two days on the basis of a warrant issued to produce the arrestee in court at a certain time for a hearing to determine if she should be detained as a material witness.  Although the procedures violated a state statute, the variance from the terms on the face of the warrant created a Fourth Amendment violation.  Sufficiently clear to be contrary to law despite lack of on-point precedent in the circuit.

Arrestee's return to the police station on the next day was not voluntary, given instruction to do so and reminder that police had an arrest warrant for her.

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c248c3bb-2a44-49a0-968d-6c71d649d45e/1/doc/17-1281_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c248c3bb-2a44-49a0-968d-6c71d649d45e/1/hilite/

First Circuit: US v. Cabrera-Rivera

Given the previous discussion among counsel during which they looked up the relevant statutes on their cellphones, plea bargain was sufficiently knowing and voluntary, despite deft's contention that he understood the term of the sentence to include any periods of supervised release.

Although the rest of the conditions of supervised release don't rise to the level of miscarriage of justice that would justify looking past the appeals waiver in the plea bargain, the unexplained provision barring unapproved contact with deft's children was plain error.

Concurrence: When supervised release conditions don't match the plea deal, contract principles come into play.

Dissent: Conditions weren't a miscarriage of justice, all considered.  Seemingly excessive conditions give probation officers useful power.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-1337P-01A.pdf

First Circuit: In re: App of George W Schlich

The prudential factors in deciding whether to order discovery for use in a foreign proceeding do not imply that either party has an obligation to establish or rebut any factor; the court did not abuse its discretion when deciding that the marginal relevance of the information sought, while sufficient to establish a prima facie claim under the statute, meant that the foreign court would likely not be receptive to the information.

Circuit split flagged.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-1377P-01A.pdf