Sufficient evidence for conspiracy conviction where the deft claims a genuine belief in the inciting statements, but finder of fact holds them to be objectively false.
Specific unanimity instruction not required, as the different mental states enumerated are alternate means of accomplishing the crime, not distinct potential elements of the crime. Where a statute lists several acts, commission of any two of which would be an element of the crime, specific unanimity as to the underlying acts is not required, as the point of the list is to identify conduct that violates the actual prohibition.
For the statutory finding that death had resulted from the crime, the finder of fact must find it to be a forseeable proximate cause; there is no need to establish that the defts actually intended to cause death, and culpability can be established by the liability of a co-conspirator.
As the cyberstalking was defamatory and part of the commission of the crime, the law as applied in this case does not violate the First Amendment.
A recusal order that might reasonably be read to transfer venue but is then amended to clarify that it only recuses the present judge does not impugn the present venue.
Possibly prejudicial prior family court records properly admitted with limiting instructions.
Statements to a therapist as part of the therapy are admissible under the hearsay exeption for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment, in addition to being evidence of the state of mind.
Hearsay emails to third parties properly admitted, as they spoke to how the acts referenced affected the writer's state of mind.
,Statements to therapist insufficiently testimonial to trigger the Confrontation Clause.
Question on cross as to whether the law enforcement officer had doubts about the defts' guilt opened the door for a vouching statement on redirect. Vouching appropriately limited by instruction.
Court did not err in holding that testimony as to deft's honesty, peacefulness, and law abiding behaviour opened the door to testimony as to specific acts related to the present prosecution.
Factual findings by the judge during sentencing increased the advisory range, and not the statutory maximum -- these findings therefore could be made by a preponderance. and without reference to the jury's findings.
Deft's presence in courthouse should have put him on notice that it was foreseeable that a law enforcement officer might be injured in the coming imbroglio.
Injury to victim's children justified the increase of sentence for harming a vulnerable victim.
Life sentence for cyberstalking conspiracy resulting in death does not offend the Eighth Amendment.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/161540p.pdf
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.