Statutory construction
A no-fault insurance law that awards one level of damages where a medical professional has determined that an emergency existed and a second level of damages where a medical professional determined that an emergency did not exist awards the latter damages when no medical professional opinion was obtained.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201413724.pdf
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Eleventh Circuit: Brad Buehrle v. City of Key West
First Amendment - Tattoos
Where the designs are not rote application of standardized designs, making tattoos is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment.
No proof in record that allowing tattoo shops would injure neighborhood's character or harm tourism.
Quoting Jimmy Buffett does not suffice.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201415354.pdf
Where the designs are not rote application of standardized designs, making tattoos is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment.
No proof in record that allowing tattoo shops would injure neighborhood's character or harm tourism.
Quoting Jimmy Buffett does not suffice.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201415354.pdf
Tenth Circuit: Jones v. Norton
S1983 -- Fourth Amendment.
Where the forensic evidence tends to indicate that the plaintiff's theory of the incident is not supported, summary judgment for the deft is appropriate.
Treaty with the tribe does not confer a right that can be remedied by S1983, as the treaty right of action lies only against the USA.
Assertions of general racism against tribe members were insufficient to prevent summary judgment on conspiracy.
Motions to amend state law tort IIED claims were either untimely by the scheduling order or would not have related back.
No spoiliaton, as FBI had custody, and police manipulation of corpse was immaterial.
As plaintiffs did not timely object to magistrate's order of costs, it is not appealable.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-4040.pdf
Where the forensic evidence tends to indicate that the plaintiff's theory of the incident is not supported, summary judgment for the deft is appropriate.
Treaty with the tribe does not confer a right that can be remedied by S1983, as the treaty right of action lies only against the USA.
Assertions of general racism against tribe members were insufficient to prevent summary judgment on conspiracy.
Motions to amend state law tort IIED claims were either untimely by the scheduling order or would not have related back.
No spoiliaton, as FBI had custody, and police manipulation of corpse was immaterial.
As plaintiffs did not timely object to magistrate's order of costs, it is not appealable.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-4040.pdf
Tenth Circuit: Shimomura v. Carlson
S1983 - TSA screeners
Qualified immunity upheld for arrest/conspiracy when an agent arrests a passenger for assault, claiming that the passenger stopped suddenly and rolled a bag backwards into the leg of a second officer following behind, who then didn't deny it. No procedural DP claim.
Dissent: As to the arresting officer, a question of material fact as to whether the elements of assault could even have been perceived.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-1418.pdf
Qualified immunity upheld for arrest/conspiracy when an agent arrests a passenger for assault, claiming that the passenger stopped suddenly and rolled a bag backwards into the leg of a second officer following behind, who then didn't deny it. No procedural DP claim.
Dissent: As to the arresting officer, a question of material fact as to whether the elements of assault could even have been perceived.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-1418.pdf
Tenth Circuit: Hagos v. Raemisch
Habeas - case/controversy, standing.
A Federal habeas petition presents a valid case or controversy with a valid means of redress when the collateral proceeding seeks to challenge one of two concurrent life sentences, where the second conviction is also subject to challenge, as the reversal of the conviction might affect the second collateral challenge.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-1497.pdf
A Federal habeas petition presents a valid case or controversy with a valid means of redress when the collateral proceeding seeks to challenge one of two concurrent life sentences, where the second conviction is also subject to challenge, as the reversal of the conviction might affect the second collateral challenge.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-1497.pdf
Tenth Circuit: United States v. Tenorio
FRE - admission of polygraph.
Deft opened the door to admission of polygraph by asserting coercion.
Not unduly prejudicial -- trial court fairly weighed.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/15/15-2037.pdf
Deft opened the door to admission of polygraph by asserting coercion.
Not unduly prejudicial -- trial court fairly weighed.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/15/15-2037.pdf
Tenth Circuit: United States v. Edwards
4A - Search Warrants.
An affiant's testimony that obscene photos are often accompanied by suggestive photos is insufficient basis for a search warrant for obscene photos based on the presence of suggestive photos.
Good faith exception applies, as there was no need for the issuing magistrate to see the photos, the warrant wasn't impermissibly overbroad, and no affirmative misstatements.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-5083.pdf
An affiant's testimony that obscene photos are often accompanied by suggestive photos is insufficient basis for a search warrant for obscene photos based on the presence of suggestive photos.
Good faith exception applies, as there was no need for the issuing magistrate to see the photos, the warrant wasn't impermissibly overbroad, and no affirmative misstatements.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-5083.pdf
Ninth Circuit: USA v. Lloyd Taylor
Statutory construction - Crim.
Federal crime of making false statements to a bank need not involve a risk of loss to the bank.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/29/14-50528.pdf
Federal crime of making false statements to a bank need not involve a risk of loss to the bank.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/29/14-50528.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Alaska Wilderness League v. Sally Jewell
Environment - Denial of En Banc
Dissent from denial:
There is no Chevron ambiguity in a statute where a fixed number of criteria are established for compliance, and findings of compliance are later accorded discretion.
ESA/CWA.
Court impermissibly allows agency to define its own scope of discretion when it allows it to define a finding of compliance as mandatory when the text does not explicitly so state.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/29/13-35866.pdf
Dissent from denial:
There is no Chevron ambiguity in a statute where a fixed number of criteria are established for compliance, and findings of compliance are later accorded discretion.
ESA/CWA.
Court impermissibly allows agency to define its own scope of discretion when it allows it to define a finding of compliance as mandatory when the text does not explicitly so state.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/29/13-35866.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Mark Oyama v. University of Hawaii
Where a university's imprimatur is a prerequisite for a specific professional certification, the university is allowed deference in matters of regulation of speech by the candidate.
A candidate in a university professional certification program is not necessarily protected under the public employee speech doctrine.
A student teacher may be removed for conduct that, in the reasonable professional judgment of the university, violates defined and established professional standards which are narrowly tailored to serve the foundational mission of the program.
Programs can look to speech as an indication of likely future conduct.
Academic dismissals do not trigger due process interests so long as they are careful and deliberate.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/29/13-16524.pdf
A candidate in a university professional certification program is not necessarily protected under the public employee speech doctrine.
A student teacher may be removed for conduct that, in the reasonable professional judgment of the university, violates defined and established professional standards which are narrowly tailored to serve the foundational mission of the program.
Programs can look to speech as an indication of likely future conduct.
Academic dismissals do not trigger due process interests so long as they are careful and deliberate.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/29/13-16524.pdf
Ninth Circuit: James McKinney v. Charles Ryan
Habeas - En banc
State courts (whether of the first instance or in final de novo review) cannot impose a causal nexus test for nonstatutory mitigating factors when deliberating a capital sentence.
On Federal collateral review, there need not be a clear indication that a state court disregarded a constitutional principle -- AEDPA language controls.
Error was not structural, but also not harmless.
Dissent:
Arizona Supreme Court review was "last instance," but not "de novo."
Presumption that state court followed law.
Court of first instance considered the mitigation.
Error did not prejudice the decision.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/29/09-99018.pdf
State courts (whether of the first instance or in final de novo review) cannot impose a causal nexus test for nonstatutory mitigating factors when deliberating a capital sentence.
On Federal collateral review, there need not be a clear indication that a state court disregarded a constitutional principle -- AEDPA language controls.
Error was not structural, but also not harmless.
Dissent:
Arizona Supreme Court review was "last instance," but not "de novo."
Presumption that state court followed law.
Court of first instance considered the mitigation.
Error did not prejudice the decision.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/29/09-99018.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Americans for Prosperity Found v. Kamala Harris
First Amendment - political contributions
Collection of donor information by state Attorney General does not risk chilling of speech, or harassment by the state or the public.
Temporary injunction barring the public disclosure of the information sustained, given the possibility that the information might be subject to mandatory statutory disclosure.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/29/15-55446.pdf
Collection of donor information by state Attorney General does not risk chilling of speech, or harassment by the state or the public.
Temporary injunction barring the public disclosure of the information sustained, given the possibility that the information might be subject to mandatory statutory disclosure.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/29/15-55446.pdf
Fifth Circuit: Yaroslav Lozovyy v. Richard Kurtz, et al
Civil procedure.
Court had discretion to accept motion to dismiss after the statutory deadline and to, without specific findings, schedule a hearing later than statute permits.
In assessing claims according to Louisiana's anti-defamation statute's summary judgment requirements, courts cannot weigh evidence, assess credibility, or determine disputed contentions of material fact.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-30086-CV0.pdf
Court had discretion to accept motion to dismiss after the statutory deadline and to, without specific findings, schedule a hearing later than statute permits.
In assessing claims according to Louisiana's anti-defamation statute's summary judgment requirements, courts cannot weigh evidence, assess credibility, or determine disputed contentions of material fact.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-30086-CV0.pdf
Fifth Circuit: Southwest Securities, FSB v. Milo Segner, Jr.
Bankruptcy.
Costs incurred by the Trustee in maintaining the property prior to the abandonment of the interest by the secured creditor can be surcharged to the secured creditor absent evidence of direct benefit.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/14/14-41463-CV0.pdf
Costs incurred by the Trustee in maintaining the property prior to the abandonment of the interest by the secured creditor can be surcharged to the secured creditor absent evidence of direct benefit.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/14/14-41463-CV0.pdf
Fourth Circuit: Joshua Rich v. US
Prisons, FTCA.
As the decision to separate certain prisoners from each other is discretionary, yet implicates considerations of public policy, suit against officials is barred under FTCA.
Claims of inadequate or omitted searches of assailants should be remanded for discovery, as they implicate claims outside of the discretionary exception.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/147204.P.pdf
As the decision to separate certain prisoners from each other is discretionary, yet implicates considerations of public policy, suit against officials is barred under FTCA.
Claims of inadequate or omitted searches of assailants should be remanded for discovery, as they implicate claims outside of the discretionary exception.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/147204.P.pdf
Third Circuit: Laurence Kaplan v. Saint Peter's Healthcare System
ERISA, Religion -- statutory construction.
While a church agency can maintain an exempt plan, only a church can establish one.
Plain meaning.
Surplussage, Expressio unius..., Remedial statute, Statutory context.
Other statements by same sources in legislative record undermine indications to the contrary.
IRS ruling was not a rulemaking, so only accorded persuasive deference. (Christiansen, not Skidmore)
In subsequent lawmaking that seemed to legislate against the background of a contrary interpretation, Congress never evinced a detailed knowledge of the statutory scheme.
First Amendment not implicated, as churches themselves are free to set up plans.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/151172p.pdf
While a church agency can maintain an exempt plan, only a church can establish one.
Plain meaning.
Surplussage, Expressio unius..., Remedial statute, Statutory context.
Other statements by same sources in legislative record undermine indications to the contrary.
IRS ruling was not a rulemaking, so only accorded persuasive deference. (Christiansen, not Skidmore)
In subsequent lawmaking that seemed to legislate against the background of a contrary interpretation, Congress never evinced a detailed knowledge of the statutory scheme.
First Amendment not implicated, as churches themselves are free to set up plans.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/151172p.pdf
Second Circuit: Mantena v. Johnson
Immigration, jurisdiction-stripping, standing.
The INA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions bar challenges to the substance of the decision, not procedural questions such as adequate notice.
When statute removes jurisdiction from a court, the correct procedure is to find subject matter jurisdiction and then determine that there is no judicially cognizable right.
When the notification of a third party is a prerequisite to the assertion of a right, a party has sufficient injury-in-fact for third-party standing upon the deprivation of notice.
Prudential standing is satisfied, as the party is asserting her own right.
Administrative definitions of standing do not touch Article III standing.
Subsequent statutory scheme altered the interest of parties, so prior administrative structure not a valid basis for deprivation of fair notice.
In the new "portability" scheme, providing notice to neither the petitioner nor the second employer violates the notice requirements.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/debf609a-5626-451b-b673-60ca2db5129b/1/doc/14-2476_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/debf609a-5626-451b-b673-60ca2db5129b/1/hilite/
The INA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions bar challenges to the substance of the decision, not procedural questions such as adequate notice.
When statute removes jurisdiction from a court, the correct procedure is to find subject matter jurisdiction and then determine that there is no judicially cognizable right.
When the notification of a third party is a prerequisite to the assertion of a right, a party has sufficient injury-in-fact for third-party standing upon the deprivation of notice.
Prudential standing is satisfied, as the party is asserting her own right.
Administrative definitions of standing do not touch Article III standing.
Subsequent statutory scheme altered the interest of parties, so prior administrative structure not a valid basis for deprivation of fair notice.
In the new "portability" scheme, providing notice to neither the petitioner nor the second employer violates the notice requirements.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/debf609a-5626-451b-b673-60ca2db5129b/1/doc/14-2476_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/debf609a-5626-451b-b673-60ca2db5129b/1/hilite/
First Circuit: Buntin v. City of Boston
Discrimination.
There is no administrative exhaustion requirement for S1981 actions.
The statute of limitations began to run with the adverse personell actions, not the written warning, as the adverse etiology had yet to crystallize.
A name-clearing hearing is not constitutionally required where the speech is not broadcast to a larger public, there is no nexus with the end of employment, and the employee did not request one.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-1667P-01A.pdf
There is no administrative exhaustion requirement for S1981 actions.
The statute of limitations began to run with the adverse personell actions, not the written warning, as the adverse etiology had yet to crystallize.
A name-clearing hearing is not constitutionally required where the speech is not broadcast to a larger public, there is no nexus with the end of employment, and the employee did not request one.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-1667P-01A.pdf
First Circuit: Thompson v. Lynch
Immigration
A former common-law marriage does not establish a basis for naturalization, as the law requires custody at the time of legal separation, and the end of the marriage was not legally recognized.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-1858P-01A.pdf
A former common-law marriage does not establish a basis for naturalization, as the law requires custody at the time of legal separation, and the end of the marriage was not legally recognized.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-1858P-01A.pdf
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