Immigration, jurisdiction-stripping, standing.
The INA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions bar challenges to the substance of the decision, not procedural questions such as adequate notice.
When statute removes jurisdiction from a court, the correct procedure is to find subject matter jurisdiction and then determine that there is no judicially cognizable right.
When the notification of a third party is a prerequisite to the assertion of a right, a party has sufficient injury-in-fact for third-party standing upon the deprivation of notice.
Prudential standing is satisfied, as the party is asserting her own right.
Administrative definitions of standing do not touch Article III standing.
Subsequent statutory scheme altered the interest of parties, so prior administrative structure not a valid basis for deprivation of fair notice.
In the new "portability" scheme, providing notice to neither the petitioner nor the second employer violates the notice requirements.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/debf609a-5626-451b-b673-60ca2db5129b/1/doc/14-2476_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/debf609a-5626-451b-b673-60ca2db5129b/1/hilite/
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.